Federal funding malfeasance by state actors Title IV grants ?

January 5, 2017 § Leave a comment

The times we look at what was done just has more meaning than we can understand how the level of funding fraud in interlaced so badly they just ignore it and pay it off and do it all over again .

Coleman v. East Joliet Fire Protection District, 2016 IL 117952

October 30, 2016 § Leave a comment

Conclusion
This court has held that the public duty rule survived the abolition of sovereign immunity

and passage of the Tort Immunity Act. See Zimmerman, 183 Ill. 2d at 45; Huey, 41 Ill. 2d at 363. A question once deliberately examined and decided should be considered as settled and closed to further argument unless compelling reasons require it. Wakulich v. Mraz, 203 Ill. 2d 223, 230-31 (2003). The doctrine of stare decisis is fundamental to our legal system and “reflects the policy of the courts ‘to stand by precedents and not to disturb settled points.’ ” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. at 230 (quoting Zimmerman, 183 Ill. 2d at 47). This court has examined and applied the public duty rule since abolition of sovereign immunity and passage of statutory immunities and the continued viability of the public duty rule is settled law of this state. I find no compelling legal rationale to overrule this precedent and abolish the public duty rule.

Moreover, I agree with those courts that have identified valid policy considerations that warrant continued judicial application of the public duty rule. The public duty rule “serves the important purpose of preventing excessive court intervention into the governmental process by protecting the exercise of law enforcement discretion.” Ezell v. Cockrell, 902 S.W.2d 394, 400-01 (Tenn. 1995). For example, when a local public entity lacks sufficient resources to meet every need of its community, police, fire, rescue ambulance, and other emergency responders “must be able to prioritize and create responses without the benefit of hindsight.” Sawicki v. Village of Ottawa Hills, 525 N.E.2d 468, 477 (Ohio 1988). Emergency first responders must often react in the midst of unfolding emergency situations when every decision they make is fraught with uncertainty and their own safety may be at risk. See Morgan v. District of Columbia, 468 A.2d 1306, 1311 (D.C. 1983). Indeed, the facts of this case illustrate the continuing need for the public duty rule. Here, the dispatch centers were so overwhelmed with emergency calls following a natural disaster that the community could not meet the demand for police, fire, ambulance, rescue, and other emergency first responders to the tornado disaster such that mutual aid from surrounding communities was required.5

5Justice Kilbride conveniently and conspicuously omits from his opinion the highly relevant fact that, at the precise time Coretta called the Will County 911 operator, this portion of Illinois was in the midst of a major tornado outbreak and disaster event. Eight tornadoes occurred that Saturday afternoon and evening over northeast Illinois. Between 5:18 p.m. and 6:30 p.m., four EF2 tornadoes struck Will County, causing injuries and widespread damage and destruction. The first EF2 tornado struck Kankakee and Will Counties, beginning at 5:18 p.m. and ending at 5:46 p.m., with a path length of 13.6 miles. This first tornado snapped and uprooted trees, blew down power lines, and caused extensive damage to homes and buildings. A second EF2 tornado struck Will County from 5:51 p.m. to 5:55 p.m., with a path length of 1.8 miles. The second tornado occurred in an open area with few trees and structures and a few buildings were damaged or destroyed. A third EF2 tornado struck Will County from 5:55p.m. to 6:08 p.m., with a path length of 3.7 miles. This third tornado caused extensive tree

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Defendants’ duty in responding to 911 calls for medical and disaster related emergencies required balancing the needs of the entire community. Under circumstances such as a mass disaster, local public entities must have the flexibility to prioritize and respond to community emergencies without having their judgment questioned.

Additionally, “[t]he public duty doctrine is based on the policy determination that when a governmental entity assumes a duty to protect the general public from harms such as criminal activity, holding the entity liable for a breach of this duty would cause municipalities to be ‘mired hopelessly in civil lawsuits … for every infraction of the law.’ ” Cope v. Utah Valley State College, 342 P.3d 243, 248 (Utah 2014) (quoting Prosser v. Kennedy Enterprises, Inc., 179 P.3d 1178, 1183 (Mont. 2008)). Local public entities often provide needed services for their communities where the risk of potential liability to individuals would discourage local public entities from providing those services.

For all of these reasons, this court should affirm what is true—that the public duty rule and the special duty exception to the public duty rule remain viable in Illinois. The issue of whether a local public entity owes a duty is a wholly distinct and separate inquiry from the issue of whether immunity is available as a defense to tort liability. For these reasons, I dissent from the court’s judgment today and would affirm the judgments of the appellate court and circuit court of Will County.

CHIEF JUSTICE GARMAN and JUSTICE KARMEIER join in this dissent.

damage, downed power lines, and extensive damage and destruction to homes and other buildings. Coretta’s call to 911 came in at 6:10 p.m.

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Justices

Clausen Miller P.C., of Chicago (Kimbley A. Kearney, Edward M. Kay, Paul X. Bozych and Timothy F. Jacobs, of counsel), for appellees Orland Fire Protection District and Eric Johnson.

Deidre Baumann, of Baumann & Shuldiner, of Chicago, for amicus curiae Illinois Trial Lawyers Association.

Jon Yambert and Rebecca Fozo, of Chilton Yambert Porter LLP, of Chicago, for amicus curiae Intergovernmental Risk Management Agency.

Scott L. Howie, of Pretzel & Stouffer Chartered, of Chicago, for amicus curiae Illinois Association of Defense Trial Counsel.

James S. Sinclair, of Stobbs, Sinclair & Associates, Ltd., of Alton, Michael Resis, of SmithAmundsen LLC, and James J. Roche and Lance J. Sherry, of James J. Roche & Associates, all of Chicago, for amici curiae Illinois Association of Fire Protection Districts et al.

Roger Huebner, of Springfield, James J. Powers, of Clark, Baird, Smith LLP, of Rosemont, and Todd K. Hayden and Kenneth M. Florey, of Robbins Schwartz, of Mokena, for amici curiae Illinois Municipal League et al.

Thomas G. DiCianni, of Ancel, Glink, Diamond, Bush, DiCianni & Krafthefer, P.C., of Chicago (David Lincoln Ader, of counsel), for amici curiae Municipal Insurance Cooperative Agency and McHenry County Municipal Risk Management Agency.

JUSTICE KILBRIDE delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

Justice Burke concurred in the judgment and opinion.

Justice Freeman specially concurred, with opinion, joined by Justice Theis.

Justice Thomas dissented, with opinion, joined by Chief Justice Garman and Justice Karmeier.

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OPINION

The common-law “public duty rule” provides that a local governmental entity and its employees owe no duty of care to individual members of the general public to provide governmental services such as police and fire protection services. See Huey v. Town of Cicero, 41 Ill. 2d 361, 363 (1968). In this appeal, we address the continued viability of the public duty rule in Illinois.

A wrongful death and survival action was filed on behalf of the estate of Coretta Coleman against defendants, East Joliet Fire Protection District1 and its ambulance crew, Louis Helis and Scott Mazor; Will County2 and its 911 operator, Laurie Zan; and the Orland Fire ProtectionDistrict,3 alsoknownasOrlandFireDistrictanddoingbusinessasOrlandCentral Dispatch, and its emergency medical dispatcher, Eric Johnson. Coleman alleged that defendants’ negligent and/or willful and wanton acts and omissions deprived Coretta of a chance to survive and caused her pain and suffering.

The circuit court of Will County granted summary judgment in favor of all defendants, finding that the public duty rule applied and that defendants owed Coretta no special duty. The appellate court affirmed. 2014 IL App (3d) 120583-U. We allowed plaintiff’s petition for leave to appeal. We now reverse and remand.

BACKGROUND

Coretta Coleman and her husband, Stanley, lived in an unincorporated area of Will County called Sugar Creek. In June 2008, all 911 calls from the Sugar Creek area were initially routed to the Laraway Public Safety Access Point, a police dispatch center operated by the Will County sheriff’s office that handled only police emergencies. The East Joliet Fire Protection District provided fire and ambulance services to the Sugar Creek area and contracted with the Orland Fire Protection District for dispatching those services. All medical emergency calls from the Sugar Creek area were transferred from the Laraway Public Safety Access Point to Orland Central Dispatch, whose operators then dispatched ambulances operated by the East Joliet Fire Protection District.

The record indicates that on June 7, 2008, at 6:10 p.m., Coretta called 911. She was connected to the Will County 911 operator on duty, Laurie Zan. Coretta told Zan that she could not breathe and needed an ambulance. Coretta gave her address as “1600 Sugar Creek Drive” in Joliet, and told Zan to “hurry.” Zan told Coretta to hold and then transferred the call to Orland Central Dispatch. Eric Johnson, an emergency medical dispatcher for Orland Central Dispatch, received Coretta’s transferred 911 call from Zan. Although the written procedures required Zan to communicate the nature of Coretta’s emergency call, Zan hung up as soon as the call was transferred and did not speak to Johnson. Johnson asked Coretta some questions

1East Joliet Fire Protection District is a municipal corporation authorized and organized under the Fire Protection District Act (70 ILCS 705/1 et seq. (West 2006)).

2Will County is a “body politic and corporate.” See (55 ILCS 5/5-1001 (West 2006)) (Counties Code).

3Orland Fire Protection District is a municipal corporation authorized and organized under the Fire Protection District Act (70 ILCS 705/1 et seq. (West 2006)).

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but received no response. Johnson did not know whether anyone was on the line or whether the call was dropped. Johnson hung up and called Coretta’s number twice but received a busy signal. Johnson testified that dispatchers are trained to call the agency that transferred the 911 call if more information is needed, but he did not. Johnson identified the nature of the call as an “unknown medical emergency” and placed the call in line for an ambulance dispatch at 6:13 p.m.

At 6:16 p.m., East Joliet Fire Protection District ambulance 524, crewed by Louis Helis and Scott Mazor, was dispatched to the Coleman residence. Helis and Mazor were given Coretta’s address and told that the 911 call involved an “unknown emergency.” Helis and Mazor arrived at the Coleman residence at 6:19 p.m. They were unable to enter the home because the doors were locked. They rang the doorbell, pounded on the doors, and yelled “Fire Department!” but no one answered. They looked in the windows of the home but did not see anyone. Helis and Mazor radioed Orland Central Dispatch for more information and asked the dispatcher, Jacqueline Johnson, to call Coretta. Jacqueline Johnson told Helis and Mazor that “we’ll try in a minute.” Jacqueline Johnson recalled that when she attempted to contact Will County for more information, the line was busy.

While at the Coleman home, Helis and Mazor were approached by two neighbors who informed them that an elderly couple lived at the residence. The man had heart issues, and they had seen him mow the lawn earlier that day, but his truck was gone. The neighbors did not have the Colemans’ phone number but said the woman was unlikely to answer the phone. Based on this information, Helis and Mazor determined that a forced entry could not be made. Helis and Mazor told the neighbors that they could not make a forced entry without a police officer present. However, they advised that the neighbors could call the police and ask them to perform a forced entry.

Helis and Mazor called their supervisor at the East Joliet Fire Protection District, who ordered them to leave the scene and go back into service. Helis and Mazor then called Orland Central Dispatch and told them to “be advised” there was “no patient.” Helis and Mazor left the Coleman residence at 6:24 p.m.

After ambulance 524 left the Coleman residence, one of the neighbors who spoke with Helis and Mazor called 911 and spoke with Zan. She told Zan the paramedics were at the Coleman residence but left when no one answered the door. The neighbor asked for police to be dispatched. Shortly thereafter, another neighbor called 911 and told Zan there was an emergency at “1600 Sugar Creek Drive.” At 6:37 p.m., Zan called Orland Central Dispatch and told Eric Johnson that she had transferred a call to him earlier from a “female [who] was unable to breathe” and that “all the neighbors are calling saying that the fire department left and did nothing.” Johnson told Zan that “they were already there.” Zan responded, “[a]ll right. Well, apparently they couldn’t get in the house, and they cleared from the call. We don’t know if the lady is alive or dead.” Johnson attempted to dispatch a second ambulance to the Coleman residence.

During her conversation with Eric Johnson, Zan did not give him Coleman’s complete address. She said “1600 Sugar Creek,” but the Colemans’ subdivision contains both a “Sugar Creek Court” and a “Sugar Creek Drive.” At 6:40 p.m., Johnson erroneously dispatched East Joliet Fire Protection District ambulance 534 to “1600 Sugar Creek Court,” instead of “1600 Sugar Creek Drive.” The ambulance crew called Orland Central Dispatch to check the address

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when there appeared to be no number 1600 on Sugar Creek Court. Eric Johnson called Will County 911 for more information about the address. While Johnson spoke with a Will County dispatcher, the crew of ambulance 534 found the Coleman residence on their own. The ambulance arrived at the house at 6:51 p.m., 41 minutes after Coretta made the initial 911 call. The crew knocked on the door, but no one answered. They then called a supervisor to ask if they should force entry. Coretta’s husband then arrived and let them into the house. The crew found Coretta unresponsive, and she was pronounced dead at the hospital. Coretta died of cardiac arrest brought on by a rapid onset of pulmonary edema. Coretta was 58 years old at the time of her death.

Coretta’s surviving husband, Stanley, as administrator of Coretta’s estate, filed claims for wrongful death and survival on behalf of the estate in the circuit court of Cook County. The case was subsequently transferred to Will County. Stanley died during the pendency of the proceedings, and the Colemans’ son, Marcus Coleman, the successor administrator of Coretta’s estate, was substituted as plaintiff in this case.

Counts I through XIV of plaintiff’s complaint alleged willful and wanton conduct against all defendants. Counts XV through XXVIII alleged negligence “instead of willful and wanton conduct with the assumption, that may be wrong, that under the current state of the law, a negligence claim will not permit recovery due to immunity.” Plaintiff’s complaint indicated the negligence allegations were made “to preserve the record in the event the law changes so that the government is held to the same standards that the citizens are, or in the event that the Plaintiff’s understanding of the law is wrong.”

Defendants East Joliet Fire Protection District, Louis Helis and Scott Mazor, as well as Orland Fire Protection District and Eric Johnson, filed motions to dismiss plaintiff’s complaint arguing, inter alia, that they were immune from civil liability pursuant to section 3.150 of the Emergency Medical Services (EMS) Systems Act (210 ILCS 50/3.150 (West 2006)). Defendants Will County and Laurie Zan filed a motion to dismiss plaintiff’s complaint arguing, inter alia, that they were immune from civil liability pursuant to section 15.1 of the Emergency Telephone System Act (50 ILCS 750/15.1 (West 2006)). In response to defendants’ motions to dismiss, plaintiff agreed that the negligence counts should be dismissed due to immunity but argued that the counts alleging willful and wanton conduct should not be dismissed because both the Emergency Medical Services (EMS) Systems Act and the Emergency Telephone System Act provide liability for willful and wanton conduct. The trial court granted the motions to dismiss in part, dismissing plaintiff’s negligence counts, but denied defendants’ motions to dismiss plaintiff’s counts alleging willful and wanton conduct.

Defendants filed motions for summary judgment on plaintiff’s remaining willful and wanton counts, arguing that: (1) they owed no duty to Coretta under the public duty rule and (2) even if they did owe Coretta a duty, they were immune from liability under section 3.150 of the Emergency Medical Services (EMS) Systems Act (210 ILCS 50/3.150 (West 2006)) and/or section 15.1 of the Emergency Telephone System Act (50 ILCS 750/15.1 (West 2006)), because their conduct was not willful and wanton. Defendants East Joliet Fire Protection District and its employees, Helis and Mazor, as well as Will County, and its employee, Zan, also asserted absolute immunity under various sections of the Local Governmental and Governmental Employees Tort Immunity Act (745 ILCS 10/1-101 et seq. (West 2006)). The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of all defendants on the willful and wanton

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counts under the public duty rule. The trial court held that the “special duty” exception to the public duty rule did not apply to any of the defendants because Coretta “initiated the contact with the municipality and was not under the direct or immediate control of any of the defendants.” The trial court did not reach the issue of immunity. The appellate court affirmed. 2014 IL App (3d) 120583-U.

We allowed plaintiff’s petition for leave to appeal (Ill. S. Ct. R. 315 (eff. Jan. 1, 2015)). We allowed amicus curiae briefs to be filed by: (1) the Illinois Trial Lawyers Association; (2) the Intergovernmental Risk Management Agency; (3) the Illinois Association of Defense Trial Counsel; (4) the Illinois Municipal League, the Illinois Public Employer Labor Relations Association and the Illinois Community College Trustees Association; (5) the Illinois Association of Fire Protection Districts, the Northern Illinois Alliance of Fire Protection Districts and the Illinois Fire Chiefs Association; and (6) the Municipal Insurance Cooperative Agency and the McHenry County Municipal Risk Management Agency. Ill. S. Ct. R. 345 (eff. Sept. 20, 2010).

ANALYSIS

Initially, we address the motion of Orland Fire Protection District and Eric Johnson to strike certain parts of plaintiff’s separate appendix as well as references to those sections contained in plaintiff’s brief, arguing that those sections are outside the appellate record. Plaintiff filed an objection to the motion to strike, pointing out that the material at issue, with the exception of two sentences, are printouts of deposition statements contained on a computer disk that is part of the record. Plaintiff asserts that he provided the hard copies for this court’s convenience and that one of the two sentences not included on the disk was testified to by another witness, while the other sentence is not implicated in the controversy before this court. Alternatively, plaintiff argues that the court can simply ignore the two sentences without striking anything from the record or the briefs. We ordered the motion taken with the case.

“This court has recognized that striking a portion of an appellate brief ‘ “is a harsh sanction,” ’ appropriate only if a violation of our procedural rules interferes with or precludes our review.” People v. Howard, 233 Ill. 2d 213, 224 (2009) (quoting In re Detention of Powell, 217 Ill. 2d 123, 132 (2005), quoting Moomaw v. Mentor H/S, Inc., 313 Ill. App. 3d 1031, 1035 (2000)). Given plaintiff’s clarification of the material and statements at issue, we find that these matters do not hinder or preclude our review of the case, and we therefore deny the motion to strike.

We begin our analysis by addressing the standard of review. Summary judgment is appropriate if the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together with affidavits, if any, viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, reveal that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. 735 ILCS 5/2-1005(c) (West 2010); Kajima Construction Services, Inc. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Co., 227 Ill. 2d 102, 106 (2007). We review the trial court’s decision on a motion for summary judgment de novo. Pielet v. Pielet, 2012 IL 112064, ¶ 30.

The primary issue we are asked to address in this appeal is whether the public duty rule remains viable. The continued viability of the public duty rule is a question of law subject to de novo review. Vancura v. Katris, 238 Ill. 2d 352, 373-74 (2010).

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The continued viability of the public duty rule depends on the interplay between the public duty rule and governmental tort immunity. Therefore, before addressing the continued viability of the public duty rule in Illinois and, ultimately, whether the trial court properly granted summary judgment in favor of defendants, we examine the origins and history of various forms of governmental tort immunity in Illinois. We begin by reviewing state governmental immunity.

State Governmental Immunity
The immunity of the State of Illinois and its agencies from suit of any kind, unless the State

consents to be sued, is rooted in the English common-law doctrine of sovereign immunity. S.J. Groves & Sons Co. v. State, 93 Ill. 2d 397, 400 (1982). Under the English common law, sovereign immunity was based on the political theory that the King could do no wrong and that “the Crown is immune from any suit to which it has not consented.” Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 139 (1950).

The first Illinois Constitution, adopted in 1818, as part of the process of Illinois being admitted to the Union, contained no provision for sovereign immunity. See Ill. Const. 1818. In 1819, shortly after being admitted to statehood, the State of Illinois adopted the common law of England. See 1833 Ill. Laws 425; see also S.J. Groves & Sons, 93 Ill. 2d at 400. The Illinois Constitution of 1848 contained the first constitutional provision addressing sovereign immunity and provided that “The general assembly shall direct by law in what manner suits may be brought against the state.” Ill. Const. 1848, art. III, § 34. In 1870, sovereign immunity officially became a constitutional doctrine in Illinois. Article IV, section 26, of the Illinois Constitution of 1870 provided: “[t]he state of Illinois shall never be made defendant in any court of law or equity.” Ill. Const. 1870, art. IV, § 26. The constitutional doctrine of sovereign immunity applied to lawsuits of any kind against the State of Illinois and its agencies unless the State consented to be sued. See Monroe v. Collins, 393 Ill. 553, 557 (1946). Consequently, no suit could be maintained against the State.

In 1877, a Commission of Claims was created to hear claims against the State (1877 Ill. Laws 64). In 1903, the Court of Claims Act repealed the Act of 1877 and gave the Court of Claims exclusive jurisdiction to rule on claims against the State. 1903 Ill. Laws 140. The Court of Claims Act of 1917 repealed the Act of 1903, but the Court of Claims retained exclusive jurisdiction to hear claims against the State. 1917 Ill. Laws 325. In 1945, a new Court of Claims Act was passed allowing for limited recovery against the State of Illinois for the torts of its agents and was subsequently amended in 1951 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1951, ch. 37, ¶ 439.8), with the Court of Claims continuing to retain exclusive jurisdiction for claims against the State. Henry Novoselsky & John Peterson, State Immunity in Illinois: The Court of Claims, 15 DePaul L. Rev. 340 (1965).

In 1970, the Committee on General Government to the Illinois Constitutional Convention of 1970 determined that the public interest would best be served by eliminating the doctrine of sovereign immunity from the new constitution. See 6 Record of Proceedings, Sixth Illinois Constitutional Convention 573 (hereinafter Proceedings). One of the proposals was worded: “[e]xcept as the General Assembly may otherwise provide, the sovereign immunity of the State of Illinois and all other units of government is abolished.” 6 Proceedings 678. The provision that was ratified, however, does not expressly include lower units of government,

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and provides: “[e]xcept as the General Assembly may provide by law, sovereign immunity in this State is abolished.” Ill. Const. 1970, art. XIII, § 4.4

In 1972, the General Assembly, pursuant to its constitutional authority, passed the State Lawsuit Immunity Act. See Pub. Act 77-1776, § 1 (eff. Jan. 1, 1972); 745 ILCS 5/0.01 et seq. (West 2014). Section 1 of the State Lawsuit Immunity Act provides that, except as provided in the Court of Claims Act (705 ILCS 505/1 et seq. (West 2014)) and other specified statutes, “the State of Illinois shall not be made a defendant or party in any court” (745 ILCS 5/1 (West 2014)). The Court of Claims Act, in turn, provides that the Court of Claims possesses exclusive jurisdiction to hear and determine various matters, including “[a]ll claims against the State for damages in cases sounding in tort, if a like cause of action would lie against a private person or corporation in a civil suit” and, with certain exceptions, limits a claimant’s damages. 705 ILCS 505/8(d) (West 2014). Accordingly, state sovereign immunity has been abolished and replaced by the State Lawsuit Immunity Act (745 ILCS 5/0.01 et seq. (West 2014)). We now examine the origins and history of local governmental tort immunity in Illinois.

Local Governmental Tort Immunity

Local governmental tort immunity in Illinois was first recognized in 1844, in Hedges v. County of Madison, 6 Ill. 567 (1844), adopting the immunity doctrine of Russell v. Men Dwelling in the County of Devon, 2 Term Rep. 671, 100 Eng. Rep. 359 (1788). Russell involved a tort action against an unincorporated county where the action was disallowed because the county was unincorporated and had no fund to pay a judgment.

In Hedges, this court held that a county was immune from liability for its failure to maintain a bridge in safe condition. The rationale was that protecting counties from liability preserved public funds for public purposes. Hedges, 6 Ill. at 571. Common-law local governmental tort immunity was eventually extended to townships (Town of Waltham v. Kemper, 55 Ill. 346 (1870)), drainage districts (Elmore v. Drainage Commissioners, 135 Ill. 269 (1890)), and school districts (Kinnare v. City of Chicago, 171 Ill. 332 (1898), overruled in part by Molitor v. Kaneland Community Unit District No. 302, 18 Ill. 2d 11 (1959)). These units of local government were considered quasi-corporations and “local subdivisions of the State, established by the sovereign power of the State, clothed with but few corporate powers.” Hollenbeck v. County of Winnebago, 95 Ill. 148, 162-63 (1880). Accordingly, no tort action could be maintained against units of local government that were established by the State.

Municipalities (cities, villages, and incorporated towns), on the other hand, were held liable under the common law for torts committed in a proprietary capacity rather than a traditional governmental activity. See, e.g., Roumbos v. City of Chicago, 332 Ill. 70, 74 (1928). In Culver v. City of Streator, 130 Ill. 238 (1889), this court observed:

4As explained below, however, this court had previously abolished the immunity of units of local government in Molitor v. Kaneland Community Unit District No. 302, 18 Ill. 2d 11 (1959). This court has recognized that the 1970 constitutional provision abolishing sovereign immunity “ ‘embodies the presumptive rule from Molitor that units of local government are subject to tort liability,’ and provides that the General Assembly possessed the exclusive power to determine whether such a governmental unit is statutorily immune from liability.” Zimmerman v. Village of Skokie, 183 Ill. 2d 30, 44 (1998) (quoting Harinek v. 161 North Clark Street Ltd. Partnership, 181 Ill. 2d 335, 344-45 (1998)).

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“in those [governmental] matters the city acts only as the agent of the State, in the discharge of duties imposed by law for the promotion and preservation of the public and general welfare, as contradistinguished from mere corporate acts, having relation to the management of its corporate or private concerns, and from which it derives some special or immediate advantage or emolument in its corporate or private character.” Culver, 130 Ill. at 244-45.

Thus, local governmental tort immunity varied, depending on whether the claim was made against a local governmental subdivision of the State or against a municipality. The common-law doctrine of local governmental tort immunity changed in 1959, with this court’s decision in Molitor, 18 Ill. 2d 11. In Molitor, this court abolished governmental tort immunity of school districts for the negligence of their employees. Molitor effectively abolished governmental tort immunity for all units of local government. See List v. O’Connor, 19 Ill. 2d 337, 340 (1960); Walker v. Forest Preserve District, 27 Ill. 2d 538 (1963).

In 1965, in response to this court’s decision in Molitor, the legislature enacted the Local Governmental and Governmental Employees Tort Immunity Act (Tort Immunity Act) (745 ILCS 10/1-101 et seq. (West 2014)). The Tort Immunity Act provides that its purpose “is to protect local public entities and public employees from liability arising from the operation of government. It grants only immunities and defenses.” 745 ILCS 10/1-101.1 (West 2014). The Tort Immunity Act applies to “[l]ocal public entit[ies],” including counties, fire protection districts, and other local governmental bodies. 745 ILCS 10/1-206 (West 2014). “The Tort Immunity Act adopted the general principle that local governmental units are liable in tort, but limited this liability with an extensive list of immunities based on specific government functions.” In re Chicago Flood Litigation, 176 Ill. 2d 179, 192 (1997).

Relevant to this appeal, the General Assembly has also enacted other legislation that provides immunity for various emergency services such as the Emergency Medical Services (EMS) Systems Act (210 ILCS 50/3.150 (West 2006)) and the Emergency Telephone System Act (50 ILCS 750/15.1 (West 2006)). Thus, in Illinois, the common-law doctrine of local governmental tort immunity has been replaced by the Tort Immunity Act and other statutes that grant tort immunity for various governmental services provided to the public. With this understanding of the history and development of state immunity and local governmental tort immunity, we now examine the origin and history of the public duty rule.

Public Duty Rule

The common-law “public duty rule” provides that local governmental entities owe no duty to individual members of the general public to provide adequate government services, such as police and fire protection. See Burdinie v. Village of Glendale Heights, 139 Ill. 2d 501, 509 (1990), overruled on other grounds in McCuen v. Peoria Park District, 163 Ill. 2d 125 (1994); Huey, 41 Ill. 2d at 363. In Leone v. City of Chicago, 156 Ill. 2d 33 (1993), this court stated:

“The courts of this State have held as a matter of common law that municipalities are generally not liable for failure to supply police or fire protection [citation], nor are they liable for injuries negligently caused by police officers or fire fighters while performing their official duties [citation]. An exception to these rules has been recognized where the municipality owes the injured party a special duty that is different from its duty to the general public.” Leone, 156 Ill. 2d at 37.

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The long-standing public duty rule “is grounded in the principle that the duty of the governmental entity to ‘preserve the well-being of the community is owed to the public at large rather than to specific members of the community.’ ” Zimmerman, 183 Ill. 2d at 32 (quoting Schaffrath v. Village of Buffalo Grove, 160 Ill. App. 3d 999, 1003 (1987)).

The public duty rule is believed to have originated in the United States Supreme Court case of South v. Maryland, 59 U.S. 396 (1855). See David S. Bowers, Tort Law—The Public Duty Doctrine: Should It Apply in the Face of Legislative Abrogation of Sovereign Immunity?—Coleman v. Cooper, 12 Campbell L. Rev. 503, 506 (1990); John Cameron McMillan, Jr., Note, Government Liability and the Public Duty Doctrine, 32 Vill. L. Rev. 505, 509 (1987). In South, the plaintiff sued the sheriff for refusing to enforce the laws of the state and for failing to protect the plaintiff after he was kidnapped and forced to pay a ransom to be released. The Supreme Court found that the sheriff’s duty to keep the peace was a “public duty, for neglect of which he is amenable to the public, and punishable by indictment only.” South, 59 U.S. at 403. The Supreme Court, citing the common law of England, indicated this had been the law for centuries. South, 59 U.S. at 403.

Some courts, however, cite to Thomas M. Cooley’s 1880 treatise on tort law as the origin of the public duty rule. Jayme S. Walker, Insulating Negligent Police Behavior in Indiana: Why the Victims of a Drunk Driver Negligently Released by a Police Officer Have No Remedy, 23 Val. U. L. Rev. 665, 674 n.60 (1989) (citing as examples of courts citing to Cooley’s treatise as the origin of the public duty rule: Trautman v. City of Stamford, 350 A.2d 782, 784 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1975); Leger v. Kelley, 110 A.2d 635, 638 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1954); Sawicki v. Village of Ottawa Hills, 525 N.E.2d 468 (Ohio 1988); DeWald v. State, 719 P.2d 643, 652-53 (Wyo. 1986)). Cooley’s treatise states:

“The rule of official responsibility, then, appears to be this: that if the duty which the official authority imposes upon an officer is a duty to the public, a failure to perform it, or an inadequate or erroneous performance, must be a public, not an individual injury and must be redressed, if at all, in some form of public prosecution. On the other hand, if the duty is a duty to the individual, then a neglect to perform it, or to perform it properly, is an individual wrong, and may support an individual action for damages.” Jayme S. Walker, Insulating Negligent Police Behavior in Indiana: Why the Victims of a Drunk Driver Negligently Released by a Police Officer Have No Remedy, 23 Val. U. L. Rev. 665, 674 n.60 (1989) (quoting Thomas M. Cooley, A Treatise on the Law of Torts or the Wrongs Which Arise Independent of Contract 379 (1880)).

The public duty doctrine was widely accepted in most jurisdictions. See Ezell v. Cockrell, 902 S.W.2d 394, 397 n.2 (Tenn. 1995) (citing Leake v. Cain, 720 P.2d 152, 155 n.6 (Colo. 1986) (en banc) (quoting Thomas M. Cooley, A Treatise on the Law of Torts or the Wrongs Which Arise Independent of Contracts 379 (1880)), and Kelly Mahon Tullier, Note, Governmental Liability for Negligent Failure to Detain Drunk Drivers, 77 Cornell L. Rev. 873, 887 (1992)). Over time, however, courts developed exceptions to the public duty doctrine. For example, the “special duty exception” to the public duty rule is applicable only in limited cases when the local governmental entity owes a special duty of care to a particular individual that is different from the duty it owes to the general public. Burdinie, 139 Ill. 2d at 508-09.

While the public duty rule is a long-standing common-law rule, we have found very few Illinois cases applying the doctrine prior to the abolition of local governmental immunity by

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¶ 45

this court in Molitor in 1959. The first decision of this court acknowledging the public duty rule and the special duty exception was in the 1968 decision of Huey, 41 Ill. 2d 361. The absence of cases applying the public duty rule and the special duty exception prior to the abolition of local governmental immunity is not surprising. Until local governmental immunity was abolished in Molitor, the public duty rule and the special duty exception remained in abeyance. In other words, local governmental immunity stood as an absolute bar to the enforcement of any civil liability arising from a breach of any duty. As one court aptly noted:

“While governmental immunity remained in effect, this type of court action remained in abeyance. It remained in abeyance not on account of absence of duty on the part of a municipality to the injured or deceased person, but for the reason that where the factual basis of the claim was involved in the performance of a governmental function (such as police duty), the State had not permitted itself or its political subdivisions or municipal corporations to be sued. Where the immunity was removed, this bar no longer stood against the enforcement of civil liability arising from breach of a duty that existed before, but which could not be enforced until the immunity was waived.” Schuster v. City of New York, 154 N.E.2d 534, 539 (N.Y. 1958).

Thus, where governmental immunity applied as an absolute defense of liability, the public duty rule and the special duty exception remained in abeyance. We now address the plaintiff’s argument that the public duty rule should be abolished in Illinois.

Continued Viability of Public Duty Rule
Plaintiff argues that the public duty rule is the equivalent of sovereign immunity and that

the public duty rule should be abolished by this court in light of the abrogation of sovereign immunity and passage of statutory tort immunities. In Huey, this court stated that the public duty rule existed “[i]ndependent[ly] of statutory or common-law concepts of sovereign immunity.” Huey, 41 Ill. 2d at 363.

The public duty rule is not the equivalent of any type of sovereign immunity. While the public duty rule and sovereign immunity are both common-law concepts, the “public duty rule” developed separately and exists independently of any constitutional, statutory or common-law concepts of “sovereign immunity.” As explained earlier in this opinion, state government immunity was grounded in the English common-law doctrine of sovereign immunity, became a state constitutional doctrine in 1870 (Ill. Const. 1870, art. IV, § 26), was constitutionally abolished in 1970 (Ill. Const. 1970, art. XIII, § 4), and was legislatively replaced by the State Lawsuit Immunity Act (745 ILCS 5/1 (West 2014)). Supra ¶¶ 26-28. Local governmental tort immunity of a county was first recognized in Hedges, 6 Ill. 567, adopting the immunity doctrine of Russell, 2 Term Rep. 671, 100 Eng. Rep. 359, and was eventually extended to other local governmental subdivisions of the State. This court abolished governmental tort immunity for all units of local government in Molitor, 18 Ill. 2d 11, and local governmental tort immunity was then replaced by statutory tort immunity. Supra ¶¶ 30-34. The public duty rule is not rooted in sovereign immunity nor did the public duty rule develop from any concepts of government immunity from suit. Rather, the public duty rule developed independently and separately from concepts of governmental immunity (see supra ¶¶ 37-39) and “is grounded in the principle that the duty of the governmental entity to

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‘preserve the well-being of the community is owed to the public at large rather than to specific members of the community.’ ” Zimmerman, 183 Ill. 2d at 32 (quoting Schaffrath, 160 Ill. App. 3d at 1003).

The issue of whether a duty is owed is a separate and distinct issue from whether a defense of governmental immunity applies. This court has consistently held that the issue of a duty is separate from the issue of immunity from liability based on that duty. See Barnett v. Zion Park District, 171 Ill. 2d 378, 388 (1996) (“[i]t is important to recognize that the existence of a duty and the existence of an immunity are separate issues”); Zimmerman, 183 Ill. 2d at 46 (same); Village of Bloomingdale v. CDG Enterprises, Inc., 196 Ill. 2d 484, 490 (2001) (same); Arteman v. Clinton Community Unit School District No. 15, 198 Ill. 2d 475, 479-80 (2002) (same); DeSmet v. County of Rock Island, 219 Ill. 2d 497, 507 (2006). In Zimmerman, this court explained the distinction between the concepts of duty and statutory immunities after ratification of the 1970 Constitution:

“ ‘The judicial abrogation of sovereign immunity merely abrogated a defense to any preexisting duty. [Citation.] *** Neither Molitor, nor any waiver of immunity creates new tort duties and liabilities. [Citations.] Under the inapplicable concept of sovereign immunity, despite any “apparent duty,” the governmental entity is immune from tort liability. This does not occur from a denial of the tort’s existence, but rather because the existing liability in tort is disallowed. In contrast, [under the rationale of the public duty rule] the tort liability or duty never existed. [Citations.]’ ” Zimmerman, 183 Ill. 2d at 46 (quoting Martin v. Lion Uniform Co., 180 Ill. App. 3d 955, 961-62 (1989)).

Zimmerman specifically noted that “[t]he distinction between an immunity and a duty is crucial, because only if a duty is found is the issue of whether an immunity or defense is available to the governmental entity considered.” Zimmerman, 183 Ill. 2d at 46. Because of this distinction between duties and immunities, “neither this court’s decision in Molitor abolishing sovereign immunity, the General Assembly’s passage of the Tort Immunity Act, nor the ratification of the 1970 Illinois Constitution altered the common-law public duty rule that a governmental entity generally owes no duty to provide an individual citizen with specific municipal services.” Zimmerman, 183 Ill. 2d at 45.

Plaintiff also argues, alternatively, that Doe-3 v. McLean County Unit District No. 5 Board of Directors, 2012 IL 112479, should be read to nullify the public duty rule implicitly because this court founded its decision on the principle that “ ‘every person owes a duty of ordinary care to all others to guard against injuries which naturally flow as a reasonably probable and foreseeable consequence of an act.’ ” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Doe-3, 2012 IL 112479, ¶ 21 (quoting Simpkins v. CSX Transportation, Inc., 2012 IL 110662, ¶ 19). However, we did not examine the continued viability of the public duty rule in Doe-3. Rather, the public duty rule was “of no moment” in that case because it was not implicated by the allegations in the plaintiffs’ complaint. Doe-3, 2012 IL 112479, ¶ 40. In fact, we emphasized that our holding in Doe-3 was limited to the particular circumstances presented in that case. Doe-3, 2012 IL 112479, ¶ 45. Accordingly, Doe-3 did not abrogate the public duty rule or otherwise announce its demise.

Plaintiff also suggests that the decisions of this court in DeSmet, 219 Ill. 2d at 508-09, and Aikens v. Morris, 145 Ill. 2d 273, 278 n.1 (1991), imply that the public duty rule may no longer have sustained viability. This court has already explicitly and repeatedly ruled that neither the

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abolition of sovereign immunity nor the legislature’s passage of statutory immunity “altered the common law public duty rule that a governmental entity generally owes no duty to provide an individual citizen with specific municipal services.” Zimmerman, 183 Ill. 2d at 45; Huey, 41 Ill. 2d at 363. Moreover, the continued viability of the public duty rule was not addressed in DeSmet, or Aikens and, therefore, those cases provide no support for abandoning the public duty rule.

A majority of jurisdictions continue to adhere to the public duty rule despite abolition of sovereign immunity and passage of immunity statutes, “concluding that, in both law and policy, the rule is sound and necessary.” Ezell, 902 S.W.2d at 399. A few jurisdictions have, however, abrogated or narrowed the application of the public duty rule. See Adams v. State, 555 P.2d 235 (Alaska 1976) (superseded by statute); Ryan v. State, 656 P.2d 597 (Ariz. 1982) (en banc) (superseded by statute); Leake v. Cain, 720 P.2d 152 (Colo. 1986) (en banc) (superseded by statute); Commercial Carrier Corp. v. Indian River County, 371 So. 2d 1010 (Fla. 1979); Jean W. v. Commonwealth, 610 N.E.2d 305 (Mass. 1993) (abrogated by statute); Southers v. City of Farmington, 263 S.W.3d 603 (Mo. 2008); Wilson v. Nepstad, 282 N.W.2d 664 (Iowa 1979); Maple v. City of Omaha, 384 N.W.2d 254 (Neb. 1986); Shear v. Board of County Commissioners, 1984-NMSC-079, 101 N.M. 671, 687 P.2d 728; Stewart v. Schmieder, 386 So. 2d 1351 (La. 1980) (superseded by statute); Brennen v. City of Eugene, 591 P.2d 719 (Or. 1979); Coffey v. City of Milwaukee, 247 N.W.2d 132 (Wis. 1976); Hopkins v. State, 702 P.2d 311 (Kan. 1985).

Some of those jurisdictions have revived the public duty rule via legislation after state courts abolished it. We note that the legislatures of Alaska, Arizona, Colorado, Massachusetts, and Louisiana have passed legislation reinstating the public duty rule. The Florida Supreme Court subsequently retreated from its earlier decision abrogating the public duty rule and limited its holding in Commercial Carrier. See Trianon Park Condominium Ass’n v. City of Hialeah, 468 So. 2d 912, 918 (Fla. 1985). The Iowa Supreme Court has clarified that it did not abolish the public duty doctrine, but its application has been narrowed. See Kolbe v. State, 625 N.W.2d 721, 729 (Iowa 2001) (“we have not expressly abolished the public duty doctrine, although we have narrowed its application”); Raas v. State, 729 N.W.2d 444, 449 (Iowa 2007) (“In Kolbe we recognized that the public-duty doctrine is still viable despite enactment of the State Tort Claims Act ***. *** [The public-duty doctrine is] alive and well in Iowa.”). Our research has found that, currently, six jurisdictions do not follow the public duty rule either by common law or statutorily: Missouri, Nebraska, New Mexico, Oregon, Wisconsin, and Kansas.

The primary rationale employed by the courts that abolished the public duty rule was that the doctrine was nothing more than a continuation of sovereign immunity and should not exist when sovereign immunity had been abolished. We have already rejected this argument. See Zimmerman, 183 Ill. 2d at 45; Huey, 41 Ill. 2d at 363. We reiterate: the public duty rule is not a form of sovereign immunity. Rather, this court has been clear that “ ‘the existence of a duty and the existence of an immunity are separate issues.’ ” Zimmerman, 183 Ill. 2d at 45 (quoting Barnett, 171 Ill. 2d at 388).

We have consistently held that the public duty rule survived the abolition of sovereign immunity and passage of the Tort Immunity Act. See Zimmerman, 183 Ill. 2d at 45; Huey, 41

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Ill. 2d at 363. Nevertheless, after much reflection, we have determined that the time has come to abandon the public duty rule and its special duty exception.

“Overruling a decision of this court, let alone an entire body of case law, necessarily implicates stare decisis principles.” People v. Sharpe, 216 Ill. 2d 481, 519 (2005). As this court recognized in Sharpe:

“ ‘The doctrine of stare decisis “expresses the policy of the courts to stand by precedents and not to disturb settled points.” Neff v. George, 364 Ill. 306, 308-09 (1939), overruled on other grounds by Tuthill v. Rendelman, 387 Ill. 321 (1944). This doctrine “is the means by which courts ensure that the law will not merely change erratically, but will develop in a principled and intelligible fashion.” Chicago Bar Ass’n v. Illinois State Board of Elections, 161 Ill. 2d 502, 510 (1994). Stare decisis enables both the people and the bar of this state “to rely upon [this court’s] decisions with assurance that they will not be lightly overruled.” Moehle v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 93 Ill. 2d 299, 304 (1982).

To be sure, stare decisis is not an inexorable command. Chicago Bar Ass’n, 161 Ill. 2d at 510; Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 842, 115 L. Ed. 2d 720, 746, 111 S. Ct. 2597, 2617 (1991) (Souter, J., concurring). However, we have consistently held that any departure from stare decisis must be specially justified (Chicago Bar Ass’n, 161 Ill. 2d at 510) and that prior decisions should not be overruled absent “good cause” (Moehle, 93 Ill. 2d at 304; Heimgaertner v. Benjamin Electric Manufacturing Co., 6 Ill. 2d 152, 166-67 (1955)) or “compelling reasons” (Moehle, 93 Ill. 2d at 304; People v. Robinson, 187 Ill. 2d 461, 463-64 (1999)). This court also has recognized that “it will not depart from precedent ‘merely because the court is of the opinion that it might decide otherwise were the question a new one.’ ” Robinson, 187 Ill. 2d at 463-64, quoting Maki v. Frelk, 40 Ill. 2d 193, 196-97 (1968) In sum, “when a rule of law has once been settled, contravening no statute or constitutional principle, such rule ought to be followed unless it can be shown that serious detriment is thereby likely to arise prejudicial to public interests.” Maki, 40 Ill. 2d at 196; see also Heidenreich v. Bremner, 260 Ill. 439, 450-51 (1913).’ ” Sharpe, 216 Ill. 2d at 519-20 (quoting Vitro v. Mihelcic, 209 Ill. 2d 76, 81-82 (2004)).

In Sharpe, this court “further noted that good cause to depart from stare decisis exists when governing decisions are unworkable or are badly reasoned.” Sharpe, 216 Ill. 2d at 520.

We believe that departing from stare decisis and abandoning the public duty rule and its special duty exception is justified for three reasons: (1) the jurisprudence has been muddled and inconsistent in the recognition and application of the public duty rule and its special duty exception; (2) application of the public duty rule is incompatible with the legislature’s grant of limited immunity in cases of willful and wanton misconduct; and (3) determination of public policy is primarily a legislative function and the legislature’s enactment of statutory immunities has rendered the public duty rule obsolete.

First, application of the public duty rule and its special duty exception has become muddled and inconsistent. Whether a plaintiff can establish that a local public entity owed a duty is a separate and distinct inquiry from the issue of whether defendants can claim a statutory immunity is available as a defense. Therefore, “[o]nce a court determines that a duty exists, it then addresses whether [statutory immunity] applies.” Harris v. Thompson, 2012 IL 112525,

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¶ 57

¶ 17 (citing Arteman, 198 Ill. 2d at 480, and Village of Bloomingdale, 196 Ill. 2d at 490). As one court has aptly noted, “[c]onceptually, the question of the applicability of a statutory immunity does not even arise until it is determined that a defendant otherwise owes a duty of care to the plaintiff and thus would be liable in the absence of such immunity.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Williams v. State, 664 P.2d 137, 139 (Cal. 1983). Frequently, however, this “logical sequence of inquiry” has been overlooked and the “immunity cart has been placed before the duty horse.” Williams, 664 P.2d at 139.

Even this court has addressed issues of immunity without determining whether any duty exists. See DeSmet, 219 Ill. 2d at 509 (“[W]e assume a defendant owes a duty, for the sake of analysis, in order to expedite the resolution of an immunity issue.”). Obviously, a duty analysis is irrelevant where immunity applies, and the inverse is also true: immunity is irrelevant when there is no duty in the first place. However, putting the “immunity cart” before the “duty horse” caused applications of these concepts to become muddled, confusing, and unduly complicated.

When a plaintiff’s cause of action is based solely on negligence, but application of a statutory immunity would be dispositive, then assuming a duty is owed expedites the resolution of the immunity issue. DeSmet, 219 Ill. 2d at 509. When a statute immunizes a local public entity from liability for a plaintiff’s injuries, the issue of whether the local public entity owed a duty to the plaintiff is irrelevant. See Harinek, 181 Ill. 2d at 347 (“because we find that the [Tort Immunity] Act immunizes the City from liability for plaintiff’s injuries, the question of whether the fire marshal had a special duty to plaintiff is irrelevant”). When the plaintiff claims a local public entity owed a special duty of care and the legislature has granted immunity to the local public entity, the special duty exception to the public duty rule cannot override statutory immunities. See Zimmerman, 183 Ill. 2d at 50; Harinek, 181 Ill. 2d at 347. Thus, in Zimmerman, this court limited application of the special duty exception to the public duty rule in cases where statutory immunities were applicable to a cause of action. Accordingly, the public duty rule and its special duty exception has proved difficult in its application when statutory immunity or limited statutory immunity applies.

Second, application of the public duty rule is incompatible with the legislature’s grant of limited immunity in cases of willful and wanton misconduct. The legislature has deemed it appropriate to allow recovery in cases of willful and wanton misconduct. When the public duty rule is applied, however, a plaintiff is precluded from pursuing a cause of action for willful and wanton misconduct, in contravention of the clear legislative decision to allow recovery against the public entity in certain cases involving willful and wanton misconduct. The legislative intent is to impose liability upon public entities under circumstances of willful and wanton misconduct. Thus, application of the public duty rule to preclude recovery is incompatible with the legislature’s grant of limited immunity.

Third, the determination of public policy is primarily a legislative function and the legislature’s enactment of statutory immunities has rendered the public duty rule obsolete. The judicially created public duty doctrine “is based on the policy determination that when a governmental entity assumes a duty to protect the general public from harms such as criminal activity, holding the entity liable for a breach of this duty would cause municipalities to be ‘mired hopelessly in civil lawsuits … for every infraction of the law.’ ” Cope v. Utah Valley State College, 342 P.3d 243, 249 (Utah 2014) (quoting Prosser v. Kennedy Enterprises, Inc.,

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¶ 60 ¶ 61

¶ 62

¶ 63 ¶ 64

¶ 65

¶ 66 ¶ 67

¶ 68

179 P.3d 1178, 1183 (Mont. 2008)). Determination of public policy is, however, primarily a legislative function. As our appellate court has aptly recognized:

“Courts are ill equipped to determine what the public policy should be. *** Further, establishing public policy may entail the balancing of political interests. This is a function of the legislature, not the courts.” Dixon Distributing Co. v. Hanover Insurance Co., 244 Ill. App. 3d 837, 852 (1993).

Here, the public policy behind the judicially created public duty rule and its special duty exception have largely been supplanted by the legislature’s enactment of statutory immunities, rendering the public duty rule and its special duty exception obsolete.

For these reasons, we conclude that the underlying purposes of the public duty rule are better served by application of conventional tort principles and the immunity protection afforded by statutes than by a rule that precludes a finding of a duty on the basis of the defendant’s status as a public entity. Accordingly, we hereby abolish the public duty rule and its special duty exception. Therefore, in cases where the legislature has not provided immunity for certain governmental activities, traditional tort principles apply. Obviously, if the legislature determines that the public policy requires it, it may codify the public duty rule, but we defer to the legislature in determining public policy. Supra ¶ 59.

Accordingly, we reverse and remand this cause to the circuit court for a determination of whether defendants may be held liable for willful and wanton conduct as alleged in the complaint.

CONCLUSION

We abolish the public duty rule and its special duty exception. We reverse the judgments of the appellate court and circuit court of Will County and remand the cause to the circuit court of Will County for further proceedings.

Reversed and remanded.

JUSTICE FREEMAN, specially concurring:

I agree that the time has come for this court to abandon the public duty rule and its special duty exception. Accordingly, I concur in today’s judgment. However, I do so for reasons that differ from those set forth in the lead opinion and that I have expressed in two previous decisions.

As I explained in Calloway v. Kinkelaar, the public duty rule is rooted in the earliest notions of sovereign immunity. Calloway v. Kinkelaar, 168 Ill. 2d 312, 334 (1995) (Freeman, J., specially concurring) (citing Burdinie v. Village of Glendale Heights, 139 Ill. 2d 501, 506-07 (1990), and 63 C.J.S. Municipal Corporations § 747 (1950)). When the 1970 Constitution was ratified, article XIII, section 4, abolished all forms of governmental immunity, except where provided for by legislative action. Id. at 336. In light of that constitutional provision, the judiciary’s power to apply the public duty doctrine ceased to exist as a means of assessing municipal tort liability. Id. Accordingly, Illinois courts are required to view “issues of governmental tort liability—not just immunity—through the prism of existing legislation.” Id. at 337 (citing Henderson v. Foster, 59 Ill. 2d 343, 349 (1974)). I repeated these

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views in Doe-3 v. McLean County Unit District No. 5 Board of Directors, 2012 IL 112479, ¶¶ 58, 60 (Freeman, J., specially concurring), and continue to adhere to them today.

The lead opinion maintains that the public duty rule developed separately and exists independently of the concept of sovereign immunity. Supra ¶¶44-45, 49, 51 (citing Zimmerman v. Village of Skokie, 183 Ill. 2d 30, 45 (1998), quoting Huey v. Town of Cicero, 41 Ill. 2d 361, 363 (1968)). From this premise, the lead opinion concludes that the abolition of sovereign immunity and the enactment of the Tort Immunity Act did not affect the viability of the public duty rule. Supra ¶ 52 (citing Zimmerman, 183 Ill. 2d at 45). I cannot concur in this conclusion.

In my view, the doctrine of sovereign immunity and the public duty rule are predicated on exactly the same concern—the notion that when a municipality performs a governmental function, the service is provided to protect the general welfare of the public. This fact is demonstrated by two of our earliest cases involving application of the doctrine of sovereign immunity to municipalities. In Culver v. City of Streator, 130 Ill. 238 (1889), and Roumbos v. City of Chicago, 332 Ill. 70 (1928), this court specifically recognized that a municipality was immune from tort liability when exercising a governmental function for the benefit of the public and the general welfare. Roumbos, 332 Ill. at 75, 80; Culver, 130 Ill. at 242-43, 245. It was recognized that, in securing the safety, health, and welfare of the public, a municipality is engaged in the performance of a public duty and is not liable for injuries caused in the performance of such duties. Roumbos, 332 Ill. at 82. Therefore, when acting in its governmental capacity to preserve the interest of the general public, a municipality represents the sovereignty of the state and is subject to suit only to the extent determined by the legislature. Id. at 77-78. Thus, the public duty rule has always been predicated on the very same basis as the concepts underlying local governmental immunity.

In addition, the public duty rule is derived from the notion that a municipality cannot be held civilly liable for failure to perform a duty owed to the general public. See supra ¶¶ 39-40 (citing South v. Maryland, 59 U.S. 396, 403 (1855) (holding that a breach of a public duty is punishable by indictment only), Thomas M. Cooley, A Treatise on the Law of Torts or the Wrongs Which Arise Independent of Contract 379 (1880) (recognizing that a breach of a public duty can be redressed, if at all, in some form of public prosecution)). As such, it unquestionably is a rule of nonliability for civil damages, which is, at its core, the fundamental basis for sovereign immunity. Indeed, this court has previously characterized it in exactly that way. DeSmet v. County of Rock Island, 219 Ill. 2d 497, 506 (2006); Zimmerman, 183 Ill. 2d at 32, 44.

When viewed in the proper historical context, it is clear that the public duty rule is firmly rooted in the concept of sovereign immunity. This court has recognized as much by observing that, with respect to certain governmental services, the public duty rule was incorporated and codified in the Tort Immunity Act. Harris, 2012 IL 112525, ¶ 17; DeSmet, 219 Ill. 2d at 508-09; Aikens v. Morris, 145 Ill. 2d 273, 278 n.1 (1991). Moreover, this court has held that “the tort liability” of a local governmental entity or its employee is “expressly controlled by the constitutional provision and by legislative prerogative as embodied in the Tort Immunity Act.” Village of Bloomingdale v. CDG Enterprises, Inc., 196 Ill. 2d 484, 489 (2001); Zimmerman, 183 Ill. 2d at 44; Burdinie, 139 Ill. 2d at 507.

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By enacting the Tort Immunity Act (745 ILCS 10/1-101 et seq. (West 2012)), Illinois adopted the general principle that local governmental units are liable in tort, but limited this liability with an extensive list of immunities based on specific government functions. Harris, 2012 IL 112525, ¶ 16 (citing Village of Bloomingdale, 196 Ill. 2d at 489; Barnett v. Zion Park District, 171 Ill. 2d 378, 385-86 (1996)). In addition, article XIII, section 4, of the 1970 Illinois Constitution provides that “[e]xcept as the General Assembly may provide by law, sovereign immunity in this State is abolished.” Ill. Const. 1970, art. XIII, § 4. This constitutional provision “ ‘now makes the General Assembly the ultimate authority in determining whether local units of government are immune from liability.’ ” Harris, 2012 IL 112525, ¶ 16 (quoting DeSmet, 219 Ill. 2d at 506). As a result, “ ‘governmental units are liable in tort on the same basis as private tortfeasors unless a tort immunity statute imposes conditions upon that liability.’ ” Harris, 2012 IL 112525, ¶ 16 (quoting In re Chicago Flood Litigation, 176 Ill. 2d 179, 192 (1997)).

Our constitutional provision abolishing sovereign immunity and the passage of various statutes providing for certain immunities with regard to official conduct of local governmental entities constitutes a comprehensive scheme for balancing the private and public interests at stake in assessing municipal tort liability. Scrupulous application of the immunity statutes enacted by the General Assembly is the best way to achieve and maintain that balance.

The lead opinion cites three reasons to explain why the public duty rule must be abolished. While I have no specific quarrel with any of those reasons, I believe that the analysis set forth above mandates the same conclusion and provides a more compelling justification.

As a final point, I agree with the observation that the legislature is free to enact a statute that codifies the public duty rule. This approach makes perfect sense and, in my view, is the only proper means of resolving the tension between the judicially created public duty rule and the constitutional abrogation of sovereign immunity. Enactment of a statute that incorporates the substance of the rule would put all of the pieces of the puzzle in the right place—as a legislative recognition that the public duty rule is a vestige of sovereign immunity that the General Assembly has elected to provide by law.

In sum, I agree that the public duty rule and its special duty exception must be abolished, though I do so for reasons that differ from those expressed in the lead opinion. I also agree that where the legislature has not provided immunity for certain governmental activities, traditional tort principles apply in deciding the potential liability of municipal defendants. Finally, because the public duty rule is obsolete, I concur that the judgments of the circuit and appellate courts in this case must be reversed and the cause must be remanded for further proceedings.

JUSTICE THEIS joins in this special concurrence.

JUSTICE THOMAS, dissenting:

Almost 20 years ago, this court held expressly that, “[d]espite abolishing common law sovereign immunity in Molitor, this court has nevertheless retained the public duty rule.” Harinek v. 161 North Clark Street Ltd. Partnership, 181 Ill. 2d 335, 345 (1998). Later that same year, this court explained that, because “the public duty rule exists ‘[i]ndependent[ly] of statutory or common-law concepts of sovereign immunity’ *** neither this court’s decision in Molitor abolishing sovereign immunity, the General Assembly’s passage of the Tort Immunity

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¶ 75 ¶ 76

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¶ 79 ¶ 80

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¶ 81 ¶ 82

¶ 83

Act, nor the ratification of the 1970 Illinois Constitution altered the common law public duty rule that a governmental entity generally owes no duty to provide an individual citizen with specific municipal services.” (Emphasis omitted.) Zimmerman v. Village of Skokie, 183 Ill. 2d 30, 45 (1998) (quoting Huey v. Town of Cicero, 41 Ill. 2d 361, 363 (1968)). Today the court abandons these well-settled principles and abolishes the public duty rule. Justice Kilbride chooses this course because he is convinced that “serious detriment is *** likely to arise prejudicial to public interests” if a principle established in 1968 and reaffirmed in 1998 remains on the books even one more day. (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Supra ¶ 53. The concurring justices, by contrast, choose this course simply because they reach conclusions different from those reached in these earlier decisions. Neither of these positions is defensible, and both make a mockery of stare decisis. Accordingly, I dissent.

Justice Kilbride’s View
At the outset, it is worth emphasizing that what is published today as the court’s “lead

opinion” in this case is actually an analysis that five members of this court expressly disavow. Indeed, though the two concurring justices agree with Justice Kilbride’s conclusion that the public duty rule should be abolished, they do so “for reasons that differ from those expressed in the lead opinion.” Supra ¶¶ 67, 77. And of course we in the dissent do not reject just Justice Kilbride’s analysis; we reject his conclusion, too. Thus, though it appears first under the caption and therefore might appear to the undiscerning reader to speak for the court, Justice Kilbride’s analysis in fact garners less support than even this dissent. That analysis therefore should not be confused with or construed as a majority position in this case.

That said, Justice Kilbride’s analysis starts in the right place, with an express acknowledgment that this court has “consistently held that the public duty rule survived the abolition of sovereign immunity and passage of the Tort Immunity Act.” Supra ¶ 52. Indeed, with both certitude and precision, Justice Kilbride reminds us that “the public duty rule is not a form of sovereign immunity” and that this court has “already rejected” the argument that the public duty rule “[is] nothing more than a continuation of sovereign immunity and should not exist when sovereign immunity had been abolished.” (Emphasis added.) Id. ¶ 51. And this is so, Justice Kilbride explains, because “ ‘ “the existence of a duty and the existence of an immunity are separate issues.” ’ ” Id. (quoting Zimmerman, 183 Ill. 2d at 45, quoting Barnett v. Zion Park District, 171 Ill. 2d 378, 388 (1996)). I wholeheartedly agree with all of this, and if Justice Kilbride had just stopped here, I happily would have joined his opinion.

Unfortunately, Justice Kilbride does not stop there. Instead, “after much reflection,” he ultimately concludes that “departing from stare decisis and abandoning the public duty rule and its special duty exception is justified for three reasons.” Supra ¶¶ 52, 54. Now one would think that these reasons would be manifestly compelling, as Justice Kilbride himself characterizes the public duty rule as “long-standing” (id. ¶¶ 38, 42) and concedes that “when a rule of law has once been settled, contravening no statute or constitutional principle, such rule ought to be followed unless it can be shown that serious detriment is thereby likely to arise prejudicial to public interests.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. ¶ 53. But they are not compelling, not in the least. In fact, they are not “reasons” at all but rather transparent ex post rationalizations for a foregone conclusion, none of which holds up to even a moment’s scrutiny.

¶ 84

– 19 –

¶ 85

The first “reason” that Justice Kilbride gives for departing from stare decisis and abandoning the long-standing public duty rule is that application of the rule has become “muddled and inconsistent” (id. ¶ 54), a point Justice Kilbride bolsters primarily with a 1983 decision from the California Supreme Court (id. ¶ 55). Now how exactly an observation made in California some 15 years before Zimmerman serves to prove that a principle settled in Zimmerman has become “muddled and inconsistent” is never made clear. Nor could it be made clear, as the quoted portion of the California Supreme Court decision hardly evinces a jurisprudence run amok. On the contrary, it merely makes the unremarkable observation that in some public duty cases, and for reasons of judicial expediency, courts will dispose of the matter on immunity grounds rather than on duty grounds. Analytical triage of this sort is standard practice in appellate review, and something this court routinely wields in a wide variety of contexts. See, e.g., Schultz v. Performance Lighting, Inc., 2013 IL 115738, ¶ 33 (“We need not address the question of whether these amendments could be applied retroactively to the case at bar because we find that even assuming that the amendments can be applied prospectively only as plaintiff suggests, they would then merely indicate a presumption that the legislature has changed the law from not requiring any action from the employer faced with an invalid notice to now requiring the employer to respond with its reason for noncompliance, but only provided that the obligee first gives notice of the non-receipt of payment.”); Village of Mundelein v. Wisconsin Central R.R., 227 Ill. 2d 281, 299 (2008) (“We need not decide that issue, however, because we conclude that even if the ordinance is treated as a state statute, the saving clause does not apply.”); Bridges v. State Board of Elections, 222 Ill. 2d 482, 490 (2006) (“We need not decide this disagreement, because even if Public Act 93–541 created additional judgeships, Public Act 94–727 clearly eliminated them ***.”); People v. Williams, 193 Ill. 2d 1, 22 (2000) (“we need not decide which view to adopt because even if we accept that there may be instances in which collateral statements should be admitted, this is not such a case”); In re A.P., 179 Ill. 2d 184, 203 (1997) (“We need not decide whether the confrontation clause requirements must be satisfied in this noncriminal setting because, even if those requirements applied, we would find them to be satisfied.”); People v. Holman, 132 Ill. 2d 128, 152 (1989) (“We need not address these arguments, however, as we find that even if evidence of the adjudication was improperly admitted, its admission was harmless.”); People v. Harris, 129 Ill. 2d 123, 165 (1989) (“We need not address the question raised in defendant’s petition for rehearing, however, because even if we assume without deciding that defendant’s claim has not been waived, defendant would not prevail on the merits of his claim.”); Edwards v. Industrial Comm’n, 96 Ill. 2d 221, 227 (1983) (“we need not decide whether the report was properly admitted, because even if it was inadmissible, the Commission’s decision is adequately supported by the manifest weight of the other evidence in the record”); In re Marriage of Olson, 96 Ill. 2d 432, 440 (1983) (“We need not decide whether Kenneth proves sufficient contributions to raise the presumption of transmutation because we find that even if such a presumption were raised, Geraldine successfully rebutted any presumption that a gift of the house to the marital estate was intended.”). Suffice it to say, if such practice renders each of these bodies of law “muddled and inconsistent” to such a degree that the protections of stare decisis no longer operate, then the common law of Illinois sits on the verge of wholesale collapse. Thankfully, this is not the case, as nothing about our routine “even if” approach to decisionmaking injects confusion into the law, and therefore nothing about it justifies a departure from stare decisis.

– 20 –

¶ 86

The second “reason” that Justice Kilbride gives for departing from stare decisis and abandoning the long-standing public duty rule is that “the public duty rule is incompatible with the legislature’s grant of limited immunity in cases of willful and wanton misconduct.” Supra ¶ 58. According to Justice Kilbride:

“The legislature has deemed it appropriate to allow recovery in cases of willful and wanton misconduct. When the public duty rule is applied, however, a plaintiff is precluded from pursuing a cause of action for willful and wanton misconduct, in contravention of the clear legislative decision to allow recovery against the public entity in certain cases involving willful and wanton misconduct. The legislative intent is to impose liability upon public entities under circumstances of willful and wanton misconduct. Thus, application of the public duty rule to preclude recovery is incompatible with the legislature’s grant of limited immunity.” Id.

There are two problems with Justice Kilbride’s reasoning here. First, this court has explained that “a court will detour from the straight path of stare decisis only for articulable reasons, and only when the court must bring its decisions into agreement with experience and newly ascertained facts.” (Emphasis added.) Chicago Bar Ass’n v. Illinois State Board of Elections, 161 Ill. 2d 502, 510 (1994). As Justice Kilbride well knows, there is absolutely nothing “new” about “the legislature’s grant of limited immunity in cases of willful and wanton misconduct.” On the contrary, the Tort Immunity Act has provided as much since its passage in 1965 (see Ill. Rev. Stat. 1965, ch. 85, ¶ 2-202), the Emergency Telephone System Act since has provided as much since its passage in 1975 (see Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 134, ¶ 45.1), and the Emergency Medical Services (EMS) Systems Act has provided as much since its passage in 1995 (see 210 ILCS 50/3.150 (West 1996)). And significantly, each of these legislative acts precedes Harinek’s express affirmation that this court “has *** retained the public duty rule.” Harinek, 181 Ill. 2d at 345. Now, what exactly constitutes a “newly ascertained fact” sufficient to justify a departure from stare decisis is an open question and probably cannot be answered ahead of time for all cases. But certainly, we can all agree that whatever a “newly ascertained fact” includes, it does not include legislative action that precedes the decision at issue by decades.

The second problem with Justice Kilbride’s invocation of the statutory exceptions for willful and wanton conduct is that, even if those exceptions did constitute “newly ascertained facts,” those exceptions would still remain wholly irrelevant. The statutory exceptions for willful and wanton conduct are exceptions from statutory grants of immunity. But as Justice Kilbride repeatedly reminds us, “[t]he issue of whether a duty is owed is a separate and distinct issue from whether a defense of governmental immunity applies.” Supra ¶ 46. As Justice Kilbride ably explains:

“The public duty rule is not rooted in sovereign immunity nor did the public duty rule develop from any concepts of government immunity from suit. Rather, the public duty rule developed independently and separately from concepts of governmental immunity [citation] and ‘is grounded in the principle that the duty of the governmental entity to “preserve the well-being of the community is owed to the public at large rather than to specific members of the community.” ’ ” Supra ¶ 45 (quoting Zimmerman, 183 Ill. 2d at 32, quoting Schaffrath, 160 Ill. App. 3d at 1003).

In other words, under the public duty rule, a government entity owes no duty to begin with. This being the case, a legislative exception to a provision of statutory immunity is of no

¶ 87

– 21 –

¶ 88

consequence, as absent a duty there can be no liability in the first place and thus nothing to be immunized from. This court recognized this expressly in Harinek when we said that “although, absent a statutory immunity, governmental units are now liable in tort on the same basis as private tortfeasors, the public duty rule nevertheless prevents such units from being held liable for their failure to provide adequate governmental services.” (Emphasis added.) Harinek, 181 Ill. 2d at 345. If the public duty rule precludes liability wholly absent a statutory immunity, then it likewise precludes liability when such immunity is granted but then limited.

Justice Kilbride’s third “reason” for departing from stare decisis and abandoning the long standing public duty rule is that “the determination of public policy is primarily a legislative function and the legislature’s enactment of statutory immunities has rendered the public duty rule obsolete.” Supra ¶ 59. Of course, this is just another way of saying that the public duty rule did not survive the passage of the Tort Immunity Act. But the problem with this, as Justice Kilbride himself concedes, is that this court has “consistently held that the public duty rule survived the abolition of sovereign immunity and passage of the Tort Immunity Act.” Id. ¶ 52. And as for why this court has “consistently held” this, no one could possibly explain it better than Justice Kilbride does:

“The issue of whether a duty is owed is a separate and distinct issue from whether a defense of governmental immunity applies. This court has consistently held that the issue of a duty is separate from the issue of immunity from liability based on that duty. [Citations.] In Zimmerman, this court explained the distinction between the concepts of duty and statutory immunities after ratification of the 1970 Constitution:

‘ “The judicial abrogation of sovereign immunity merely abrogated a defense to any preexisting duty. [Citation.] *** Neither Molitor, nor any waiver of immunity creates new tort duties and liabilities. [Citations.] Under the inapplicable concept of sovereign immunity, despite any ‘apparent duty,’ the governmental entity is immune from tort liability. This does not occur from a denial of the tort’s existence, but rather because the existing liability in tort is disallowed. In contrast, [under the rationale of the public duty rule] the tort liability or duty never existed. [Citations.]” ’ Zimmerman, 183 Ill. 2d at 46 (quoting Martin v. Lion Uniform Co., 180 Ill. App. 3d 955, 961-62 (1989)).

Zimmerman specifically noted that ‘[t]he distinction between an immunity and a duty is crucial, because only if a duty is found is the issue of whether an immunity or defense is available to the governmental entity considered.’ Zimmerman, 183 Ill. 2d at 46. Because of this distinction between duties and immunities, ‘neither this court’s decision in Molitor abolishing sovereign immunity, the General Assembly’s passage of the Tort Immunity Act, nor the ratification of the 1970 Illinois Constitution altered the common-law public duty rule that a governmental entity generally owes no duty to provide an individual citizen with specific municipal services.’ Zimmerman, 183 Ill. 2d at 45.” Id. ¶ 46.

Thus, it is not just that this court has “consistently held” that the public duty rule survived passage of the Tort Immunity Act. Rather, this court also has consistently explained that the reason for this holding is that the public duty rule and the Tort Immunity Act have nothing to do with each other. There is absolutely nothing, then, about the “the legislature’s enactment of statutory immunities” that renders the public duty rule obsolete.

– 22 –

¶ 89

As importantly, even if the “the legislature’s enactment of statutory immunities” did somehow implicate the public duty rule, such legislative action is not a recent innovation, and it therefore cannot justify a departure from this court’s consistent holding that the public duty rule has survived such action. Huey was decided in 1968, and it was in 1998 that Harinek expressly stated that “this court has *** retained the public duty rule.” Harinek, 181 Ill. 2d at 345. How can legislative action that in one case predates even Huey and in all cases precedes Harinek possibly serve as a basis for overruling those cases in 2015? It cannot, and Justice Kilbride understandably makes no attempt to explain how it can. It is not enough simply to assert as a basis for departing from stare decisis propositions that this court has previously considered and “consistently” rejected. Nor is it enough to cite facts of which the court has been fully aware for half a century, as if those facts were new. The bottom line is that absolutely nothing has changed since this court’s decisions in Huey, Harinek, and Zimmerman, and consequently nothing justifies a departure from stare decisis as to the principles those cases establish.

To summarize, then, the compelling new reasons that Justice Kilbride gives for departing from stare decisis and abandoning the long-standing public duty rule are that (1) the rule lends itself to the use of a common analytical tool and (2) the rule is incompatible with statutory provisions that have been on the books for decades and that this court has repeatedly held have nothing to do with the public duty rule. Neither of these reasons is credible, let alone convincing. And this matters, because the importance of stare decisis is that it “permits society to presume that fundamental principles are established in the law rather than in the proclivities of individuals.” Chicago Bar Ass’n, 161 Ill. 2d at 510. That being the case, if the reasons proffered by Justice Kilbride are sufficient to justify a departure from stare decisis in this case, then we may as well abandon the stare decisis doctrine altogether. Because if they are good enough, then anything is good enough, and we need not waste our time going through the motions of what will essentially have become a hollow exercise.

The Concurring Justices

If Justice Kilbride’s stare decisis discussion is unconvincing, at least it has the benefit of existing, which cannot be said of the concurring justices’ discussion. Indeed, the concurring justices reach conclusions wholly contrary to settled precedent of this court without even mentioning the stare decisis doctrine, let alone applying it.

At one point, the concurring justices assert that they “cannot concur” in the conclusion that “the abolition of sovereign immunity and the enactment of the Tort Immunity Act did not affect the viability of the public duty rule.” Supra ¶ 69. At another point, they assert that “the public duty has always been predicated on the very same basis as the concepts underlying local governmental immunity,” such that “it is clear that the public duty rule is firmly rooted in the concept of sovereign immunity.” Id. ¶¶ 70, 72. With respect to my concurring colleagues, these are not matters for them to decide, as previous courts have spoken directly to these matters and reached entirely different conclusions. Again, Zimmerman states expressly that “neither this court’s decision in Molitor abolishing sovereign immunity, the General Assembly’s passage of the Tort Immunity Act, nor the ratification of the 1970 Illinois Constitution altered the common law public duty rule that a governmental entity generally owes no duty to provide an individual citizen with specific municipal services.” Zimmerman,

¶ 90

¶ 91 ¶ 92

¶ 93

– 23 –

¶ 94

183 Ill. 2d at 45. And the reason for this holding was the court’s prior determination in Huey that “[the public duty] rule existed ‘[i]ndependent[ly] of statutory or common-law concepts of sovereign immunity.’ ” (Emphasis omitted.) Id. (quoting Huey, 41 Ill. 2d at 363). Now I understand that the concurring justices might strongly disagree with these conclusions and therefore wish that they had been on the court when Huey and Zimmerman were decided so as to speak to those decisions. But that ship has sailed, and that is not how our system works. Indeed, this court has been emphatic that “stare decisis *** ‘expresses the policy of the courts to stand by precedents and to not disturb settled points’ ” (People v. Caballes, 221 Ill. 2d 282, 313 (2006) (quoting Neff v. George, 364 Ill. 306, 308-09 (1936))), and therefore we “will not depart from precedent ‘merely because the court is of the opinion that it might decide otherwise were the question a new one.’ ” People v. Robinson, 187 Ill. 2d 461, 464 (1999) (quoting Maki v. Frelk, 40 Ill. 2d 193, 196-97 (1968)). Yet that is precisely what the concurring justices are doing here.

In his dissent in People v. Mitchell, 189 Ill. 2d 312 (2000), Justice Freeman spoke passionately in defense of the stare decisis doctrine. I will quote at length from that dissent, with minor modification, as I am convinced that Justice Freeman makes the best case possible in opposition to the court’s action today:

“Today’s result sends the unfortunate message to the bench, the bar, and the public that ‘this court does not decide issues based on the law, but based instead on who happens to be sitting on the court at a particular time.’ People v. Lewis, 88 Ill. 2d 129, 170 (1981) (Clark, J., concurring). ***

***

As I have endeavored to show by my review of our precedent, not one circumstance has changed in our [public duty rule] jurisprudence since this court announced its decision in [Zimmerman]. All of the legal arguments set forth in today’s opinion are the same arguments that were made and considered at the time [Huey and Zimmerman] were decided. *** The only ‘circumstance’ that has changed since this court announced [Zimmerman] is that [Justices Kilbride, Burke, and Theis have since joined the court]. I submit that this type of ‘circumstance’ does not rise to the level necessary to overturn the doctrine of stare decisis.

Unfortunately, today’s decision demonstrates that ‘[p]ower, not reason, is the new currency of this [c]ourt’s decisionmaking.’ Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 844, 115 L. Ed. 2d 720, 748, 111 S. Ct. 2597, 2619 (1991) (Marshall, J., dissenting, joined by Blackmun, J.). As noted throughout this dissent, neither the law nor the facts supporting the [public duty rule] underwent any change since the time that this court issued its last [public duty rule] case, [Zimmerman], in 1998. Only the personnel of this court did. One must now wonder how many other of our previous decisions *** will be similarly overruled on the basis of a change in court personnel. *** If this court can so cavalierly disregard its own precedent, we surely cannot expect others to follow it nor can we justly criticize those who do not. Today’s imprudent action invites nothing but open defiance of our precedent and seriously undermines this court’s legitimacy. Clearly, there is no genuine reason not to apply [the public duty rule] to the present case, and the court’s attempt to style its decision as one made to [“resolv[e] the tension between the judicially created public duty rule and the constitutional abrogation of

– 24 –

¶ 95 ¶ 96

sovereign immunity” (supra ¶ 76)] is beyond credulity. It is obvious to me, at least, that four members of this court are willing to discard any principle of *** law that, in the past, was recognized *** and with which four justices currently disagree. This does not bode well for the future. *** It is my sincere hope that this case will not serve as a model for future courts to follow.” Mitchell, 189 Ill. 2d at 396-99 (Freeman, J., dissenting, joined by Harrison, C.J., and McMorrow, J.).

Conclusion
This court has held that the public duty rule survived the abolition of sovereign immunity

and passage of the Tort Immunity Act. See Zimmerman, 183 Ill. 2d at 45; Huey, 41 Ill. 2d at 363. A question once deliberately examined and decided should be considered as settled and closed to further argument unless compelling reasons require it. Wakulich v. Mraz, 203 Ill. 2d 223, 230-31 (2003). The doctrine of stare decisis is fundamental to our legal system and “reflects the policy of the courts ‘to stand by precedents and not to disturb settled points.’ ” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. at 230 (quoting Zimmerman, 183 Ill. 2d at 47). This court has examined and applied the public duty rule since abolition of sovereign immunity and passage of statutory immunities and the continued viability of the public duty rule is settled law of this state. I find no compelling legal rationale to overrule this precedent and abolish the public duty rule.

Moreover, I agree with those courts that have identified valid policy considerations that warrant continued judicial application of the public duty rule. The public duty rule “serves the important purpose of preventing excessive court intervention into the governmental process by protecting the exercise of law enforcement discretion.” Ezell v. Cockrell, 902 S.W.2d 394, 400-01 (Tenn. 1995). For example, when a local public entity lacks sufficient resources to meet every need of its community, police, fire, rescue ambulance, and other emergency responders “must be able to prioritize and create responses without the benefit of hindsight.” Sawicki v. Village of Ottawa Hills, 525 N.E.2d 468, 477 (Ohio 1988). Emergency first responders must often react in the midst of unfolding emergency situations when every decision they make is fraught with uncertainty and their own safety may be at risk. See Morgan v. District of Columbia, 468 A.2d 1306, 1311 (D.C. 1983). Indeed, the facts of this case illustrate the continuing need for the public duty rule. Here, the dispatch centers were so overwhelmed with emergency calls following a natural disaster that the community could not meet the demand for police, fire, ambulance, rescue, and other emergency first responders to the tornado disaster such that mutual aid from surrounding communities was required.5

5Justice Kilbride conveniently and conspicuously omits from his opinion the highly relevant fact that, at the precise time Coretta called the Will County 911 operator, this portion of Illinois was in the midst of a major tornado outbreak and disaster event. Eight tornadoes occurred that Saturday afternoon and evening over northeast Illinois. Between 5:18 p.m. and 6:30 p.m., four EF2 tornadoes struck Will County, causing injuries and widespread damage and destruction. The first EF2 tornado struck Kankakee and Will Counties, beginning at 5:18 p.m. and ending at 5:46 p.m., with a path length of 13.6 miles. This first tornado snapped and uprooted trees, blew down power lines, and caused extensive damage to homes and buildings. A second EF2 tornado struck Will County from 5:51 p.m. to 5:55 p.m., with a path length of 1.8 miles. The second tornado occurred in an open area with few trees and structures and a few buildings were damaged or destroyed. A third EF2 tornado struck Will County from 5:55p.m. to 6:08 p.m., with a path length of 3.7 miles. This third tornado caused extensive tree

¶ 97

– 25 –

¶ 98

¶ 99

¶ 100

Defendants’ duty in responding to 911 calls for medical and disaster related emergencies required balancing the needs of the entire community. Under circumstances such as a mass disaster, local public entities must have the flexibility to prioritize and respond to community emergencies without having their judgment questioned.

Additionally, “[t]he public duty doctrine is based on the policy determination that when a governmental entity assumes a duty to protect the general public from harms such as criminal activity, holding the entity liable for a breach of this duty would cause municipalities to be ‘mired hopelessly in civil lawsuits … for every infraction of the law.’ ” Cope v. Utah Valley State College, 342 P.3d 243, 248 (Utah 2014) (quoting Prosser v. Kennedy Enterprises, Inc., 179 P.3d 1178, 1183 (Mont. 2008)). Local public entities often provide needed services for their communities where the risk of potential liability to individuals would discourage local public entities from providing those services.

For all of these reasons, this court should affirm what is true—that the public duty rule and the special duty exception to the public duty rule remain viable in Illinois. The issue of whether a local public entity owes a duty is a wholly distinct and separate inquiry from the issue of whether immunity is available as a defense to tort liability. For these reasons, I dissent from the court’s judgment today and would affirm the judgments of the appellate court and circuit court of Will County.

CHIEF JUSTICE GARMAN and JUSTICE KARMEIER join in this dissent.

damage, downed power lines, and extensive damage and destruction to homes and other buildings. Coretta’s call to 911 came in at 6:10 p.m.

– 26 –

Great read on Domestic And FAMILY Violence

March 5, 2016 § Leave a comment

LINK: http://fathersforlife.org/fv/family_violence_main_page.htm#B_Men_Additional_Info

Family Violence — Main Page

Table of Contents

Key to Index

Abstracts of articles

Men’s Help-Index

Introduction

Family violence in Canada
BY EEVA SODHI
Life with Mom, a sign (or button, if you wish) identifying the most common form of family violence, a mother manhandling and seriously abusing her son
Life with Mom is often violent
It is a sad reality,
but few talk about it very much. Why not?

Key to Index

Introduction
The Magnitude of Family Violence
Hate Propaganda
The relative propensity of the sexes to be violent
Who is at fault in Domestic Violence
Lesbian Violence
Various Articles
Myths and Facts about Domestic Violence
Canadian FV Statistics — A collection of information by E. Sodhi
Research on Domestic Violence against Males
Recent research
Sexual abuse of children
Women’s Violence
False Abuse Allegations
Index

Introduction
Men Also Suffer from Domestic Violence Monday, 22 Oct 2007, FOX2 Detroit

History of the politics of DV

The Facts About Spousal Conflict: Personal Responsibility Must Be Expected in Public Policy. Family violence myths debunked by the American Coalition for Fathers & Children (ACFC — Missouri Chapter)

The Nature of Domestic Violence Against Men

So, you think that you are being abused…or maybe you don’t think so…

Telling the Truth about Domestic Violence

Controversy Within Family Violence Research

The Magnitude of Family Violence

Domestic Violence and the Male Victim,
By Anne Lewis and Dr. Sotirios Sarantakos

Domestic Violence Policies: Where Did We Go Wrong?
By Sotirios Sarantakos

Leading Causes of Death by age group and sex
(US data for 1995, age group <1-24 years)

US Murders 1995

US Murders 1996

The troubles with DV murder statistics

[US] Domestic Homicide of Male Spouses by Females: A Review for Death Investigators, By Lt. Cynthia T. Ferguson, CNM, MSN

Hate Propaganda
Alberta Government's website promotes hatred against men

Extremist and cunning misandry: Alberta FV round-table discussion workbook
Massive, government-sponsored hate propaganda that demonizes all Canadian men at the Canadian National Clearing House on Family Violence, a Health Canada web site

The ACLU Sports Hall of Shame — Hate Crimes Against Women?

Toronto Police Hate-Crime Policies — Tools for the suppression of free speech, a symptom of universal national and international trends?

London Metropolitan Police Service launches hate-propaganda campaign against men (2005 03 16)

Researching the "Rape Culture" of America — An Investigation of Feminist Claims about Rape, By Christina Hoff Sommers, Associate Professor of Philosophy, Clark University

We've all heard that "one in four" college women will be victims of rape or attempted rape during their years on campus. Michael Wright takes a look at campus POLICE RECORDS and comes up with… a different answer.
Read the article (off-site)

THE HATE MONGERS
From THE CASSANDRA PAPERS, by Andy Turnbull
Neo Nazis and other overt hate groups are amateurs. THE HATE MONGERS explains how some elements of the women movement use lies and hate to MAKE BIG MONEY for themselves, and how they harm our culture and our economy.

Read THE HATE MONGERS

The relative propensity of the sexes to be violent AND THE REASONS WHY OUR PERCEPTIONS ABOUT THE GENDERS IN THAT RESPECT HAVE BECOME SO BIASED AND DISTORTED
Men are More Likely Than Women to Be Victims in Dating Violence, UNH Expert Says
(UNH Media Relations, May 19, 2006; off-site)

…This research is part of the International Dating Violence Study, a multinational study of violence against dating partners by university students. A consortium of researchers around the world collected data from 13,601 students at 68 universities in 32 nations.

In the paper, Straus calls for an end to the focus on men as the only perpetrators of dating violence, saying the refusal to recognize the multi-causal nature of the problem is hampering the effort to end domestic violence and ignoring half the perpetrators. As recently as December 2005, the National Institute of Justice refused to consider applications for funding that dealt with male victims….

Abused Men – The Other Half of Domestic Violence involving adults. Violence involving children is another story

Alberta MLAs are being asked for help

A letter to John Ashcroft, United States Attorney General,
Re: VAWA and Domestic Violence Against Men and Children

A letter to the Alberta Justice Department, in response to a call for input to a discussion paper on a proposal for a new Prevention of Family Violence Act

A tool kit to destroy families

Battered-Men Shelters

Battered Men — Resources and links, by Bert Hoff
Additional information and help-line index

Battered-Women Shelters

Betty Friedan and her Lies — Carl Friedan tells his side of the horror story of his twenty-year marriage to his violent ex-wife.

Bill C-245 (1998), an act to amend the Criminal Code, penalties for sexual offences involving children, to be read the second time and to be referred to a committee

Domestic-Violence Industry: A Cult

Family Violence Studies: A Brief History, by Richard Bennett

History of domestic violence among male patients presenting to an urban emergency department.

C. Crawford Mechem, MD, Frances S. Shofer, PhD, Sharon S. Reinhard, BA, EMT, Sarah Hornig, BSN, RN and Elizabeth Datner, MD

From the Department of Emergency Medicine, Hospital of the University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, PA (CCM, FSS, SSR, SH, ED).

Address for correspondence and reprints: C. Crawford Mechem, MD, Department of Emergency Medicine, Hospital of the University of Pennsylvania, 3400 Spruce Street, Philadelphia, PA 19104-4283. Fax: 215-662-3953; e-mail: mechemc@mail.med.upenn.edu

Academy of Emergency Medicine 1999 Aug;6(8):786-91
Abstract and publication details

Husband Abuse: An Overview of Research and Perspectives

Prepared by Leslie Tutty for the Family Violence Prevention Unit, Health Canada.

This discussion paper provides insight into the issue of abuse against men by their intimate partners. It summarizes information from three sources: literature on husband abuse, studies in which abused men describe their experiences, and conversations with representatives from approximately 40 family violence treatment programs and men's issues groups. 1999, 28 p. Full Paper (292kB PDF file – off-site)

Intimate Partner Abuse Against Men – Overview Paper
by Dr. Eugen Lupri and Dr. Elaine Grandin

For the National Clearinghouse on Family Violence, Health Canada.

This document provides an overview of the available research findings on the nature and extent of abuse committed by women against their intimate male partners, as well as an examination of the various methods that have been used in that research. It identifies risk factors and the physical and psychological effects on victims. Finally, it considers issues relevant to prevention and offers suggestions on what individuals (victims, friends and professionals) can do and what resources and services they can access for help. 2004, 13 p. Full Report (109kB PDF file – off-site)

Intimate Partner Abuse Against Men [and Boys]
A compendium of resources,
National Clearinghouse on Family Violence, Health Canada (off-site)

Video on violent women

Male and Female DV-rates

The implications of the report from which the excerpt shown below was copied are mind-boggling.

What research tels us about domestic violence, March 2002

Unfortunately, the report is completely in graphics format, which is why the PDF file is so large. Nevertheless, it is worth having a copy of.

The report is based on a an examination of a good number of DV studies from all over the world. It confirms what those with open and objective minds have known for decades: interspousal violence is not a male monopoly. It is at least as often committed by women as it is committed by men.

That the myth of men having a monopoly on that aspect of intimate partner violence persisted for so long in the face of so much evidence from reputable and even government sources is nothing less than evidence of the power of feminist propaganda promoted by people in thrall to a totalitarian ideology.

Japan joins the community of nations falling victim to the tactic of implementing domestic- or family-violence laws for the destruction of families

Lenore Walker's "The Battered Woman" has become the bible of family violence for people making their living off and promoting the battered women's industry. Her husband, Morton Flax, shot himself.

Malicious Mother Syndrome — A letter from a handicapped woman who was abused — along with her sisters — by her own mother

Video on violent women

One Father's Story — The sad story of the destruction of one family on account of family violence.

Rape is a crime that is now being investigated routinely through the help of DNA testing

References Examining Assaults by Women on their Spouses or Male Partners: An Annotated Bibliography, by Martin Fiebert

Sex Differences in Aggression Between Heterosexual Partners: A Meta-Analytic Review, by John Archer, University of Central Lancashire

War in the Family — An account of one battle skirmish near Calgary, Alberta, Canada.

WFN Press Release, Re: New (1997) Bureau of Justice Stats on DV

"Where’s My Frying Pan?" Women and Domestic Violence

Women Hit Too! — An article by Nancy Updike in the May/June 1999 issue of Mother Jones

The Myth of Female Innocence — Many "experts" state that the characteristics of serial killers include "male", "Caucasian", and exclude women. What then are we to make of cases like these?

Countess Elizabeth Bathory "of Hungary, who bled to death 610 peasant girls, whom she abducted and kept in her castle dungeon so that she could fill rejuvenating beauty baths with their youthful blood." (Patricia Pearson, "When She Was Bad: The Myth of Female Innocence," p. 156)

On December 20th, 1985, Marybeth Tinning in Schenectady, New York, murdered the last of her nine children, a four-week-old baby girl Tami Lynn. The others, aged from a few weeks to five years, were killed by her over the preceding 14 years. The cause of all deaths had been diagnosed as SIDS. The community members had began to wonder after the sixth child died. Not until the ninth death happened were charges laid.

Melissa Ann Russel: Internet Black Widow — She killed two men for their money and defrauded others, including the Canadian taxpayers, of theirs. However, she did receive an early parole for a murder convictions in Canada, became a $50,000/year spokeswoman for battered wives, and then promptly picked, married, exploited and killed her next victim, an 85-year-old man.

People like Jack the Ripper (he killed five prostitutes) are the stuff of movie after movie, book after book, headline-story after headline story in the papers. People like Jane Toppan (a nurse and contemporary of Jack the Ripper who killed as many as or more than 90 patients for no other reason than that she wanted to set a record) and like Countess Elizabeth Bathory are forgotten, as is the fact that the vast majority of serious or fatal family violence victims fell victim to women's violence and also the fact that the vast majority of serial killers is female.

Who is at fault in Domestic Violence
Patrol Constables' Perceptions of Wife Assault Sensitivity Training, A Qualitative Evaluation, Theresa Petkau, June 1998

Emergency Department Injury Surveillance Report

Video on violent women

Lesbian Violence
The Bloody and Deadly Countess Elizabeth Bathory

Lesbian couples are far more violent than heterosexual couples

Erin Pizzey comments on A Lesbian DV Brochure

If the data collected are accurate, then Gay DV is the fastest growing sector of domestic violence.
Various Articles
The Facts About Spousal Conflict: Personal Responsibility Must Be Expected in Public Policy. Family violence myths debunked by the American Coalition for Fathers & Children (ACFC — Missouri Chapter)

Knocked for six: the myth of a nation of wife batterers
by Neil Lyndon and Paul Ashton, The Sunday Times of London 1995 01 29

Quotes from and articles by Armin Brott

Extracts from 'Manufacturing Concern' (see also the message announcing "Manufacturing Concern")

Husband Battering, a section in David Throop's Men's Issues Index

Wendy McElroy discusses: Feminist Urban Legends

Spare the rod and run for cover — When students hold the cards, school violence grows, especially among the girls

Myths and Facts about Domestic Violence
Myths and Facts about family violence (containing analyses and summaries of, and references and some links to, a large number of US Bureau of Justice reports and to Canadian and British sources)

Fact: Political correctness drives and taints the politics of domestic violence statistics

Fact: Quote from a press release August 27, 1997 by the Women's Freedom Network

Fact: Reena Sommer — Male and Female Perpetrated Partner Abuse: Testing a Diathesis-Stress Model

Fact: The "Rule of Thumb for Wife-Beating" Hoax
Wife beating was always illegal

Fact: The Super Bowl Wife-Battering Hoax

Fact: To round out the picture, have a look at the collection of articles at the DOMESTIC VIOLENCE FORUM of the Shared Parenting web site.

Fact: Domestic Violence in Gay "Families"

Fact: FBI Statistics on Spousal Murder, they show that gender equality works in weird and wondrous ways.

Fact: Women are the gentler sex?

Newsletters: Common Sense and Domestic Violence

Canadian FV Statistics — A collection of information by E. Sodhi
Research on domestic violence against males:

Sexual abuse of children
An Examination of Assumed Properties of Child Sexual Abuse Based on Non-clinical Samples
Are your children safe in school?
The big list: Female teachers with students
Most comprehensive account on Internet of women predators on campus, by WorldNetDailyNews
Health Canada: Adolescent Sex Offenders

USA: (2003 11 06) A Lansing mother accused of molesting her 2-year-old son and broadcasting the incident on the Internet pleaded no contest Wednesday to a reduced charge.

Meet 'Women's Auxiliary of NAMBLA'

Lesbian Child Sexual Abuse

A report by the National Clearing House on Family Violence, "The Invisible Boy", examines the issue of the abuse of boys and how our society fails these poor children.

Political opportunism and grand-standing vs. scientific facts: Women commit at least as much sexual abuse of children as do men.

The extent of involvement by women in the sexual abuse of children

Female perpetrators of sexual abuse of boys , by Jim Hopper, Ph.D. (off-site)

Sexual Abuse of Males — Prevalence, Possible Lasting Effects, and Resources, by Jim Hopper, Ph.D. (off-site)

The Invisible Boy: Revisioning the Victimization of Male Children and Teens
by Frederick Mathews

Prepared by the Canadian Foster Family Association (CFFA) on behalf of the
National Clearinghouse on Family Violence of Health Canada.

This document provides insight into the issue of sexual abuse of male children and teens. It outlines the prevalence of sexual abuse against boys and male teens in various settings, summarizes data on the perpetrators of the abuse, and identifies some of the effects on survivors. Implications for research, assessment, treatment, and PROGRAM development are also presented. 1996, 68 p. Full Report (287kB PDF file, off-site)

The extent of involvement of women in the sexual abuse of children

The psychological impact of sexual abuse: Content analysis of interviews with male survivors (off-site) [warning, 2 megabyte PDF], Lisak, D. (1994), Journal of Traumatic Stress, 7, 525-548.

Woman charged with raping boy after giving birth to his son

Women commit at least as much child sexual abuse as do men

Women's Violence
An Examination of Assumed Properties of Child Sexual Abuse Based on Non-clinical Samples

Child Abuse: Statistics, Research, and Resources

Gender as a factor in the Family Violence Courts, by Eeva Sodhi

Husband-Killing Syndicates (h/t: http://news.mensactivism.org/node/17318)

At the WEBSITE of The Unknown History of MISANDRY

FACTS which contradict what is taught in the universities and which even run counter to the assumptions made by critics of misandry.

Lesbian Child Sexual Abuse

Meet 'Women's Auxiliary of NAMBLA'

More deadly than the male
Media hide the fact women are far more likely than men are to kill their children.

NSPCC research findings of women's role in the maltreatment of children in the UK

The extent of involvement of women in the sexual abuse of children

The quiet horror — The murder rate for U.S. females is highest in the first year of life.

Women commit at least as much child sexual abuse as do men

When statistics for all family violence victims are examined, it emerges that women, primarily mothers, perpetrate by far the largest share of incidents of violence in the family.

False Abuse Allegations
False Abuse Allegations, how many of them are there, and what are their consequences?

Getting rid of dad —False allegations levelled against men who are said to have sexually abused their children have become the weapon of choice in custody battles following divorce and separation.

Almost half of child abuse allegations that are being investigated are proven to be unsubstantiated. Another quarter cannot be substantiated, although suspicions remain.

Introduction

For a few decades now, and increasingly so during the past two, man-hating gender activists created and nurtured the perception that men are violent, especially against women. All too often, examples of the violence by men are produced and used to extrapolate and project from them to all male members of the human species. Common sense should tell anyone that such depictions simply cannot be true.
The vast majority of humanity, men or women, are simply not violent. Moreover, men are being indoctrinated from childhood on that boys don't hit girls. It used to be that girls were being educated that violence doesn't become them, but increasingly so in the last two decades girls are being taught to have the "right to hit back," from where it now follows in the minds of many girls and women that they have the right to hit, whether that is done by them in aggression or in retaliation.
We must therefore not be surprised that violence by women is becoming more and more prevalent. In many states in the US arrest rates for women in incidents of domestic violence are growing and now comprise about one third of all arrests in DV incidents.
The truth, from an authoritative source, is,

From the cover of "Not Guilty : In Defence of the Modern Man," by David thoms. The image is an adaptation from Michael Angelo's Creation (of Adam), where in that adpation God gives the "thumb-up" after seeing what he has produced with Adam
Adaptation from Michel Angelo's Creation (Adam)
FROM THE COVER OF DAVID THOMAS' Not Guilty : In Defence of the Modern Man

The History of the Development of the Popular Views and Politics of Domestic Violence, a collection of links to articles that explain the workings of the massive feminist propaganda campaign that served the purpose — quite effectively — to demonize all men.
The Nature of Domestic Violence Against Men

The following is Anne Bransdon's DV against men model from her Web site. It is a great improvement on the power wheel from the Duluth model. (Click on the image to see larger version.)

Domestic violence against men, Australian model
copied from Model 1999 at Anne Bransdon's site

Anne Bransdon's WEBSITE is currently experiencing difficulties with accessibility, but Anne Bransdon gives permission to use her model far and wide. Send an e-mail to Anne Bransdon.

So, you think that you are being abused…or maybe you don't think so

Looking through Anne Bransdon's excellent categories and indexes of types of abuse, many will without doubt recognize familiar aspects of every-day life they became subjected to over the last little while or over the period of their lives that they escaped from and consider to have been hell on earth.

There are many more people who are right now involved or have been in circumstances in which many of the items in Anne Bransdon's model play dominant roles, but many of those people don't realize at all that any of those aspects are at work to destroy their relationship, their love, their family and their lives.

The devil is in the details. Maybe all that is required, for abusers and abused alike, is to consider an account by someone who was involved in an abusive relationship and who, even though he escaped from it, is still very strongly entangled in it. It is quite obvious that the individual who wrote the account managed to get a good grasp on the mass of tiny details in everyday life that constitute abuse in his case. It is also obvious that perhaps he is setting himself up to being abused by insisting that his abuser should act rationally. Abusers abuse because they don't, and often can't, act rationally.

As Erin Pizzey explains in her discussion paper on how to deal with terrorists in the family (that was the original title of the paper, but it is now called "Working with violent women"), it is not reasonable to expect terrorists (that's what abusers are) to act rationally. There is therefore not much point in expecting to be able to negotiate with terrorists. What is necessary in trying to get terrorists to make concessions or to have them live by equitable principles is to make them live by the law. A line needs to be drawn, and terrorists need to have pointed out to them what the rules are by which they must guide their conduct. They need to learn what they can get away with and what not. They need to learn that they can't get away with as much as they wish to get away with.

Here is the link to the story I mentioned. The story is an excellent account of such details that an abused man began to recognize and analyse in looking back at the abuse he experienced through his abuser, the mother of his son, his former wife.

She Married The Great Satan…And Lived To Tell The Tale
By "Tex," her angry, abused ex-husband
Published at Dr. Irene's verbal abuse site

Telling the Truth about Domestic Violence

by David Fontes, Psy.D., CEAP, August 29, 1998 (PDF 67kB)

The essay by David Fontes is an objective and thorough overview of violence research and statistics. It provides truths that will surprise many, but its title, "Telling The Truth about Domestic Violence", is misleading.

Although the essay is very thorough in telling the truth, it mentions nothing at all about many forms of domestic violence, such as that against children, violence between siblings, violence by children against parents, or violence against the elderly. Therefore a better title for the essay would be, "Telling the Truth about Partner Violence", because that is the only type of domestic violence the essay tells about. However, the essay is immensely valuable for debunking feminist claims about "domestic violence".

David Fontes' essay analyzes not only the fallacies inherent in misleading partner violence statistics, it also identifies the failings and shortcomings of the various and often even official, governmental (therefore apparently credible) sources of the partner violence statistics misandrist feminists love to use in their propaganda war against men and families.

It is deliberate and not an accident that the essay's focus is solely on partner violence. The article is a refutation of a "domestic violence" article by feminist Kate Orman.

Like all feminists that use distorted and selective "domestic violence" statistics as propaganda tools when speaking or writing about partner violence, so as to stress the victim status of women, Kate Orman, too, is blind to all forms of violence in families except men's violence against women. All such feminists, if they mention women's violence against men at all, use it only for propagandistic purposes. They use at best only what of it gets reported (the vast majority of it doesn't) and, most importantly, they only use it to falsely claim, and thereby indoctrinate the public into believing, that there are vastly fewer incidents of violence by women against men than there are of violence by men against women.

By such propaganda tactics feminist were successful over the years in making "domestic violence" a synonym for "violence against women".

Full Story

http://www.reenasommerassociates.mb.ca/a_wfn.html

Controversy Within Family Violence Research
Reena Sommer, Ph.D.; University of Manitoba, Canada

PRESENTED AT THE WOMEN'S FREEDOM NETWORK CONFERENCE

Washington, D.C., 14-15 October 1995

I have been involved in the study of partner abuse for the past eight years. My interest in this issue began with my concern about violence against women. Initially, my examination of partner abuse focused on courtship violence and spouse abuse perpetrated by men. My sense of curiosity led me to go against what I believed to be the essence of partner abuse and examine the prevalence of abuse perpetrated by women. Quite to my surprise, I found that women too, abused their male partners at equivalent rates. This led me to search out other research examining this issue, and again to my surprise I found my findings were not an anomaly, but had considerable support.

Considerable controversy has emerged as a result of studies finding equivalent rates of abuse for males and females. The rift within family violence research centers on how researchers have approached their investigations. On one hand, there is the unidimensional approach to partner abuse advanced by feminists. They view abuse between intimates as a problem of women being abused by men whereby the abuse is perceived as a dichotomous variable (abuse/no abuse) and seen in its most severe forms. On the other hand, sociologists and family researchers view partner abuse as being gender neutral and occurring along a continuum with no abuse at one end and very severe abuse at the other end.

I would like to address this controversy by first providing a backdrop to how the divisiveness in the study of partner abuse developed, and then by discussing some of the methodological and practical issues that have contributed to it….

(Full Story)

The Magnitude of Family Violence

Family violence is a relatively small problem in relation to all other causes of deaths and injury. It is difficult to understand why comprehensive information that permits a look at the relative numbers of victims is so hard to find. Most likely the reason for that is that when information pertaining to victims of family violence is looked at in relation to victims of other causes of death, it becomes obvious that the number of family violence victims appears to be exceedingly and trivially small, and that is the last thing the proponent of the domestic violence industry want people to learn much about. Therefore they keep that fact hidden and distorted. They can easily do that, because they control what information we get to see. They refuse with all their might to tell us the truth, nothing but and all of the truth.
To take such an objective view provides another truth. Boys and men comprise the vast majority of all victims of violence, but not only that, they comprise the vast majority of deaths in every major category of death except for the elderly, which are comprised largely of women. That stands to reason. Women are far more likely than men to survive into old age. Depending on country, their life expectancy is up to 14 years higher than that of men.
So, because women comprise the vast majority of the elderly, it stands to reason that far, far more elderly women than elderly men die. Nevertheless, feminists have absolutely no compunction in painting that circumstance – which is an outcome of all-pervasive discrimination against boys and men – as another manifestation of discrimination against women. Go figure, the fact that women live far longer lives than men is, according to the feminists, due to sex-discrimination against women. Let's not worry about that. Such contradictions are prevalent in, and govern, feminist dialectics.
However, on account of the changing demographics that are caused by and fuel the escalating destruction of our families, women face special challenges, both as victims and perpetrators, due to abuse of the elderly. The population sector containing the elderly grows at an unprecedented rate in absolute terms and especially in relative terms with respect to the size of the younger productive population sector that has to bear the increasingly unbearably large responsibility to care and provide for those who can't produce anything any longer for themselves. One of the consequences of that is an enormous increase (150% in the US from 1986 to 1996) in elderly abuse, predominantly cases of neglect of the elderly. ( TRENDS IN ELDER ABUSE IN DOMESTIC SETTINGS, NATIONAL CENTER ON ELDER ABUSE, Elder Abuse Information Series No. 2 (PDF 42kB); see also Prisoners in Their Own Homes, by Glenn Sacks. In addition, the St. Louis Post-Dispatch produced an excellent series of articles on the topic of fatal elder abuse and neglect in US nursing homes (it is estimated that tens of tousands of cases happen each year), Neglected to Death (Oct. 12 – 19, 2002). See abstract and commentary relating to the articles and to the problem of elder abuse and neglect in nursing home and hospitals.)

UPDATE2004 06 24:

If you have concerns about these and other issues related to the condition of seniors, visit, contact and perhaps even join:

SUN — Seniors United Now

The up- and coming, rapidly-growing advocacy organization for seniors (55 years and over) in Alberta

There are in the order of about half a million or more people of age 55 and over in Alberta. If all of them were to join SUN, they would become the most powerful advocacy organization in Alberta; and seniors would no longer be robbed of their comforts and otherwise ignored.
At the price of one package of cigarettes seniors will be able to gain a voice that will be heard by a government that otherwise can and will take from seniors what they worked for all their life to enjoy in their old age.

If you are concerned about how seniors are affected by the planned, systematic destruction of our families and society, a search at google.com (for elderly OR seniors OR grandparent OR grandfather OR grandmother site:http://fathersforlife.org) will provide you with the links to about 84 web pages at Fathers for Life that will be of interest to you.

Pure and simple, any claims that women are being killed by their boyfriends and husbands in large and ever escalating numbers are nothing but plain and unadulterated propaganda and fantasy.
Furthermore, a slight majority of interspousal violence is initiated and committed by women. However, any claims that men are the perpetrators of the majority of domestic violence become quite simply ludicrous when all types of domestic violence are examined. When children are being abused, they, too, become victims of domestic violence. Unfortunately, on account of the world-wide feminist-driven and feminist-inspired and sustained propaganda campaign against men, violence by women has become virtually invisible.
The sad consequence of that is that ever escalating numbers of children are being abused by their mothers. Those abused children, in turn, become then the next generation of adults who abuse other adults and primarily children. Women commit the vast majority of all child abuse.

All discussions of family violence revolve around the information shown in the following graph and the subsequent tables. Unless we look at the information in the graph and keep it in mind, we'll lose sight of the fact that all discussions pertaining to women as victims of violence are addressing information that has been taken out of context.

Leading causes of deaths, by age group and sex (US data)
Discussion of and links to sources of data

Murders in the US in 1995

Victims

Percent
of total

Total Murders 21,597 100
Men 16,630 77
Women 3,752 17.4
Children (Source: CPS) 1,215 5.6

Men murdered by girlfriends/wives 3% of 16,630 499 2.31
Women murdered by boyfriends/husbands 26% of 3,752 976 4.52
Source: FBI Uniform Crime Report for 1995
Discussion of data

Murders in the US in 1996

Victims Percent
of total
Total Murders 19,645 100
Men 15,848 80.7
Women 2,711 13.8
Children
(Child Fatality Fact Sheet) 1,077 5.5

Men murdered by girlfriends/wives 3% of 15,848 475 2.4
Women murdered by boyfriends/husband 30% of 2,711 813 4.1
Source: FBI Uniform Crime Report for 1996
Discussion of data

See also:

The troubles with DV murder statistics
[US] Domestic Homicide of Male Spouses by Females: A Review for Death Investigators, By Lt. Cynthia T. Ferguson, CNM, MSN (June 2004)
Women in intimate relationships are frequently portrayed by modern society as “the victim” when violence or a homicide occurs in intimate partnerships. These women CONTINUE to be seen by American culture as weak individuals who suffer at the hands of domineering, powerful, over-controlling men. The myth that spousal murder is committed almost entirely by husbands who kill their wives must be dispelled. In addition, there are discrepancies within the legal system, where a female is treated more leniently for murdering her husband, than when a man murders his wife. The criminal-justice system has failed to see equality in the crimes in the sexes, allowing for biased views that women are less malevolent than men and more prone to victimization. The stigma is intractable that women are more likely than men to feel remorse for what they’ve done. While this may be true for some women; for others, the truth is much farther away than many suspect. [Full story]

The relative propensity of the two sexes to be violent and the reasons why our perceptions about that became so biased and distorted.
A tool kit to destroy families — Two responses to an article The last rites for chivalry, by Suzanne Fields, The Washington Times, Dec. 3, 2001
Battered-Men Shelters

Sorry, although partner violence is an equal-opportunity crime in which partners of both sexes engage to an equal extent, there are no shelters for battered men in Canada, and perhaps one or two in the USA, apparently none in the rest of the world.

Well, that may not be quite true. If you are a man and need shelter from an abusive woman, you can find it in the local jail, but you can't take your children anywhere to PROTECT them from an abusive woman.

If you are a battered man, check the following for some help and advice:

Battered Men — Resources and links

Additional information and help lines

If you are looking for a battered men's shelter, what is available to men is described in in a photo essay at The Shattered Men website. A telling comparison is being made between typical women's shelters and typical men's shelters to identify the differences between the services available for male and female abuse victims.

Battered-Women Shelters – Index

Although partner violence is an equal-opportunity crime in which partners of both sexes engage to an equal extent, and although there are virtually no shelters for battered men (none in Canada), there are about 500 shelters for battered women in Canada and an enormously large number of battered women's shelters in the USA and other developed nations. However, battered-women shelters do have their very own peculiar problems.

Are Abuse Shelters good for Children?

Domestic-Violence Industry: A Cult

Thanks to dvmen.org for obtaining the permission to post the following five remarkable articles that were published between December 4th and 8th of 2001 by Dave Brown, senior editor and columnist for the Canadian newspaper The Ottawa Citizen.

Men challenge 'bible' of violence against women: A Toronto inquest will question the validity of a standard reference book, Tuesday, December 4, 2001.

Burying the ghosts of a violent past: Husband in wheelchair became focus of wife's rage, Wednesday, December 5, 2001.

'I learned it's a system that doesn't listen': Wife still terrified by threats from family violence specialists, Thursday, December 6, 2001.

Turning domestic violence into a religion: Inquest an epic social debate, Friday, December 7, 2001.

Cult of the domestic-violence industry: Where are the great numbers of victims we hear about?, Saturday, December 8, 2001.

Dave Brown mentioned in the last of the preceding articles that evidence of an epidemic of domestic violence against women does not exist. He investigated and found that during the Year 2000 not one patient who had been a victim of domestic violence had been admitted at the Civic campus of the Ottawa Hospital (one of several serving a populace of about 1.4 million people). He did find that at the Civic's emergency room during that year twenty-nine patients had been treated for injuries received in domestic violence incidents, but that number was not broken down by gender (it appears that the relationships between the perpetrators and their victims were not identified nor what proportion of the victims were children).

The report "Emergency Department Injury Surveillance Report, South Fraser Health Region April 1, 2001 – June 30, 2001", by the South Fraser Health Region Emergency Department provides similar findings. Although the number of patients in the category "Homicide and Injury Purposely Inflicted by Other" who received treatment is not broken down by victim-perpetrator relationship nor whether any of the injuries were obtained in domestic-violence incidents, the report does provide a breakdown by sex. Domestic violence victims comprise a very small fraction of the totals in those categories. (See Distribution of Cause of Injury, South Fraser Health Region Emergency Department)

See also the analyses of domestic violence statistics done by Eeva Sodhi, someone who devoted years of her life to discovering the Truth about Family Violence.

Family Violence Studies: A Brief History, by Richard Bennett
References Examining Assaults by Women on their Spouses or Male Partners: An Annotated Bibliography, by Martin S. Fiebert , Department of Psychology, California State University, Long Beach
"…206 scholarly investigations: 159 empirical studies and 47 reviews… The aggregate sample size in the reviewed studies exceeds 197,900."

The bibliography is also accessible at
http://familyop.freeshell.org/DV/assault.html

A letter to John Ashcroft, United States Attorney General,
Re: VAWA and Domestic Violence Against Men and Children,
by Robert A. Fink, M. D. April 9, 2001
Women Hit Too! — An article by Nancy Updike in the May/June 1999 issue of Mother Jones identifies research findings by reputable social scientists that show that women predominate as perpetrators in incidents of domestic violence. Links are provided at this page that will lead to the sources of the findings.
Betty Friedan and her Lies — Carl Friedan tells his side of the horror story of his twenty-year marriage to his violent ex-wife.
"Where’s My Frying Pan?" Women and Domestic Violence by Richard C. Weiss
Abused Men – The Other Half of Domestic Violence involving adults. Violence involving children is another story.
The new book Abused Men – The Hidden Side of Domestic Violence, By Philip W. Cook, offers real solutions to the problem of domestic violence. This pioneering book has received positive reviews from many leading professionals in the field, including Dr. Murray A. Strauss, Dr. Judith Sherven, Dr. James Sniechowski, Erin Pizzey, Dr. Malcolm George, and Reena Sommer, Ph.D.

A letter to the Alberta Justice Department, in response to a call for input to a discussion paper on a proposal for a new Prevention of Family Violence Act. The letter contains the full text of the proposal as well as comments on the individual sections. http://fathersforlife.org/doc/comments.doc (74 KB, MSWord 6 Doc.)
Battered Men — Resources and links, by Bert Hoff (Sorry, it's extremely unlikely to find shelter in your location if you need it, but at least there is advice — and some help if you need it.)
Japan joins the community of nations falling victim to the tactic of implementing domestic- or family-violence laws for the destruction of families — ostensibly for the PROTECTION of women, in reality needless laws, as there are more than enough laws to provide protection to women already. (See also Parents' rights a demographic issue, by COLIN P.A. JONES, Special to The JAPAN Times, Tuesday, July 18, 2006)
Rape is a crime that is now being investigated routinely through the help of DNA testing. DNA testing will and does clear a large number of falsely accused men as shown in the report by the U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice PROGRAMS
False Rape Charges Hurt Real Victims, By Wendy McElroy, foxnews.com, 2003 07 22
Convicted by Juries, Exonerated by Science: Case Studies in the Use of DNA Evidence to Establish Innocence After Trial
About 25 percent of men accused and convicted of rape are innocent, perhaps as many as 40 percent — at least as recent as 1989, and many of those innocent men are still serving time for their alleged crime. Obviously, women were either mistaken or lied in identifying the wrong man as their attacker. That still leaves open to question how many of the men not exonerated by DNA evidence had in reality consensual sex. How many rape charges in spousal rapes are false? The US DoJ report provides no information about that, but it would be definitely worth looking into.

2004 09 16
Convictions based on faulty hair analysis

Today, The Globe and Mail carried the following article:

Faulty analysis sparks call for review of cases

Flawed hair findings used in convictions, Manitoba study says

Thursday, September 16, 2004 – Page A7

The article mentioned that 39 analyses were re-examined and tested against DNA evidence. Four analyses were found to have been "faulty". Under the circumstances, "faulty" is a euphemism for "wrong".

The article says nothing about how many hair analyses had been used in all or whether selection criteria were used to pick the 39 Manitoba murder cases. How about rape cases, assaults and robberies that had no fatal outcomes but nevertheless resulted in severe sentences? (False or fabricated "evidence" are by no means a rare occurrence, see full story)

In the US, there are an estimated 520,000 false rape allegations a year — 98.1% of all reported cases. (Eeva Sodhi, Debunking Domestic Violence Statistics; Rape)
Malicious Mother Syndrome — A letter from a handicapped woman who was abused — along with her sisters — by her own mother
WFN Press Release, Re: New (1997) Bureau of Justice Stats on DV
From: Cathy Young
Date: 8/26/97 6:03 PM
Subject: Women's Freedom Network (WFN) Press Release – Domestic Violence

NEW JUSTICE DEPARTMENT FINDINGS SHOW
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE ADVOCATES HAVE EXAGGERATED STATISTICS, WOMEN'S GROUP SAYS

Sex Differences in Aggression Between Heterosexual Partners: A Meta-Analytic Review

John Archer
University of Central Lancashire

Meta-analyses of sex differences in physical aggression to heterosexual partners and in its physical consequences are reported. Women were slightly more likely (d = -.05) than men to use one or more act of physical aggression and to use such acts more frequently. Men were more likely (d = .15) to inflict an injury, and overall 62% of those injured by a partner were women. The findings partially support previous claims that different methods of measurement produce conflicting results, but there was also evidence that the sample was an important moderator of effect size. CONTINUOUS models showed that younger aged dating samples and a lower proportion of physically aggressive males predicted effect sizes in the female direction. Analyses were limited by the available database, which is biased toward young dating samples in the United States. Wider variations are discussed in terms of two conflicting norms about physical aggression to partners that operate to different degrees in different cultures.

Psychological Bulletin, 2000. Vol. 136. No. 5. 651-680
(0033-2909/00/$5.00 DOI: 10.1037//0033-2909.126.5.65)
(A ZIP file of the study (337kB – in English)
can be downloaded from the WEBSITE of the Maenner Buero – Trier,
which contains an extensive bibliography on German- and English-language studies and articles on domestic violence.)

John Archer tested for various types of bias in the hundreds of studies he analyzed and found that bias is present to varying extents in some of them and needed to be allowed and corrected for.
It must be stressed that studies based solely on police- or judicial statistics suffer from feminist-induced bias in self-reporting, biased POLICE REPORTING, biased judicial decisions, and from major differences in psychological and social conditioning of men and women.
Women are far more likely than men to report that they experienced aggression. Women are being encouraged to report transgressions against themselves, whether their allegations are true or false, while men are being pressured through social conditioning not to complain about women's transgressions. What aggravates the differences are Zero-Tolerance policies, on account of which in many jurisdictions men will be arrested in partner-violence altercations, even if they are seriously injured and women are not.

Additional information and help-line index:

Domestic Violence Against Men —Gender Equality in Social Services Delivery, by Bert H. Hoff
Gender Polarization in Domestic Violence Perpetrator PROGRAMS —The "Duluth Model", by Bert H. Hoff
Domestic Violence, Official Washington State Policy: The Gender Neutrality Joke, by Bert H. Hoff
Battered Men, Men's Personal Stories, by Bert H. Hoff
Men's Help Lines (International)

Index for countries other than the US(by dvmen.org)
Domestic Violence against Men (UK, TV Channel 4, Thursday 7 January 1999)
U.K. Crisis line
NZ Crisis Line
NZ Crisis Line for Men in Big Demand After TV Ad
USA — Various States

DVmen listed all the resource they could find for men and women at http://www.dvmen.org/dv-191.htm#pgfId-998197, by state.

USA — New York

Where to Find Help

Note: The help-line information provided in the following comes from an article in Newsday. If you are a man seeking help, it is unlikely that you'll be comfortable, or will even get the help you seek, with all but the Father's Rights Association of Long Island mentioned in the article. I checked all of the other organizations over. Just judging from their web sites, it appears that they'll not have much sympathy, let alone anything else, to offer to men, given that they do a fair bit of men-bashing at their web sites. —WHS

According to Clarice Murphy, PROGRAM director for the Victim's Information Bureau of Suffolk, a man-or woman-who may be being abused should ask: Am I fearful of my partner's behavior? Am I afraid of being physically harmed? Do I feel I need to change my behavior in order to avoid harm? Does my partner control my behavior with threats or intimidation? If the answer to any of these questions is yes, contact a domestic violence agency or advocacy group to get more information about legal, counseling and advocacy services.

Local agencies include:

Nassau County Coalition Against Domestic Violence
516-542-0404 or http://www.zip2.com/newsday/cadv/

Suffolk County Coalition Against Domestic Violence
631-666-8833 or http://www.sccadv.org/

Victim's Information Bureau of Suffolk
631-360-3606 or http://www.vibs.org/

Father's Rights Association of Long Island
516-783-1636 or http://www.sarilaw.com/fathersrights/

Safe Horizons in Manhattan,
800-621-HOPE or http://www.safehorizons.org/

USA — Pennsylvania

http://www.MensCustodyShelterNetwork.com

I became a mother when my son was born. I became a father when my son died and left me his kids. I became an advocate of father's rights when they tried to take the kids away.
MCSN assists with physical, mental and counseling needs for men falsely accused in custody disputes. We attempt to obtain temporary housing for men taken from their homes and their children with restraining orders based on false accusations.

— Carol Carpec
Founder of MCSN

Canada

Directory of Services and PROGRAMS for Abused Men in Canada
by the NCFV
Published by the authority of the Minister of Health Canada, 2004
Prepared by: National Clearinghouse on Family Violence, Family Violence Prevention Unit, Public Health Agency of Canada
Grouped by province and territory, this 2004 directory lists programs and services across Canada. Each organization is listed with a brief description of its services as well as current contact information. Where possible, the description identifies the type of service provided, relevant fees, and whether services are available in English and/or French. 2004, 66p. Full Directory (393kB PDF file)

Logo for link to Canadian Equal Parenting Groups Directory
Canada, Ontario

Huron County

Men’s Help Line
Divorce, Loss of Children, Family Violence

— Balance Beam 519-525-2066 24 Hours a day

Family Violence and Divorce hurt men and their children. Men are at a disadvantage in divorce and legal conflict.
Balance Beam provides emotional support and strategy planning to ease the trauma of conflict and breakup. Our goal is to mediate and encourage non-adversarial resolution of family problems.
Canadian studies show men and women initiate violence equally in domestic relationships, yet men suffer silently and are scorned when they do speak out.
Fathers are often denied access to their children. Studies document that as many as 30% to 40% of fathers are denied access to their children.
Many children who are denied fathers are harmed by the loss of their fathers love. Studies document an increase in drug abuse, falling grades, violence and teen pregnancy.
Divorce hurts grandparents too. Many children are denied access to grandparents and many people have been injured by the fallout from divorce wars.
Balance Beam works to mediate and resolve family disputes. Our help line is available to anyone needing a friend who understands the loss of children, home or partner.

Finally, a Men’s Support Group

[Please note:
Don't use this help line if you are not located in Huron County. This help line is being paid for out of the operator's own pocket (there is no funding for any such effort or for any men's issues).
If you are located elsewhere and need help, please contact me. I'll try and put you in touch with someone in your area. Details of my address are at the bottom of this web page.

Thank you,

Walter Schneider ]

Canada, Alberta

Parents Helping Parents will assist any parent anywhere in Canada who is facing false abuse allegations. Parents Helping Parents has been successful in returning about 200 children from the clutches of child welfare officials and re-uniting them with their parents. Parents Helping Parents was instrumental in bringing about a substantial reduction in the incidence rate of false abuse allegations in Manitoba and is now working to bring about a similar reform of the child welfare system in Alberta to bring about similar results there.

Canada, Alberta, Greater Calgary Area

Canadians for Organizational & Personal Accountability
(403) 417-1171
Gary Nixon, Ph.D. (403) 217-1532
Men's Transition Centre (403) 290-00776
National Fathers' Rights association (403) 285-8586
The following may seem incongruous in the context, but if you think about it a bit, they are more likely than many others to be able to help. Every orphaned grandparent is most likely the parent of a disenfranchised father. From my experience, these are people likely to have been involved with the consequences of husband battering (the battering or abuse of their son).

Orphaned Grandparents Association (780) 961-3168
Canadian Grandparents' Rights Association (403) 284-3887
If you need help and live in the Edmonton area, especially east of Edmonton, call Walter or Ruth at (780) 796-2306. That is a local call from Edmonton. The line may often be busy, that's a sign that we are home. Don't give up and try again. E-mail: Fathers for Life

Last, but not least, many MLAs will provide help or at least direction and advice to men in need of it, even though most MLAs are very reluctant to speak out publicly in sympathy for the plight of men. Let's not forget that our MLAs are fearful of the wrath of radical feminists and feminist sympathizers. Here is the URL that contains a contact list for Alberta MLAs: http://www.assembly.ab.ca/conlist/Mla.htm

Alberta MLAs are being asked for help
If all else fails, you are down and out, have no reasonable hope left, and you are contemplating suicide, there still is a better way out. Check the article Dads on the run and contact us at (Country code 1, area code 780) 796-2306, or write to us for more information.
Who is at fault?

Lenore Walker's "The Battered Woman" has become the bible of family violence for people making their living off and promoting the battered women's industry. Her husband, Morton Flax, shot himself. People close to the couple have described Dr. Flax as a "battered man." [Family Violence Studies: A Brief History, by Richard Bennett, http://www.bennett.com/fv/history.html ]
ACCOUNT AND ACCOUNTABILITY: PATROL CONSTABLES' PERCEPTIONS OF WIFE ASSAULT SENSITIVITY TRAINING, A QUALITATIVE EVALUATION (EXECUTIVE SUMMARY), Theresa Petkau, June 1998
Emergency Department Injury Surveillance Report
South Fraser Health Region
April 1, 2001 – June 30, 2001
Distribution of Cause of Injury
South Fraser Health Region Emergency Department

Lesbian Violence —

The Bloody and Deadly Countess Elizabeth Bathory — The connection between the right-of-the-first-night hoax and the true story of Countess Elizabeth Bathory (1560 – August 1614)
Lesbian couples are far more violent than heterosexual couples
Erin Pizzey comments on A Lesbian DV Brochure
If the data collected is accurate, then Gay DV is the fastest growing sector of domestic violence.
Various Articles

The Facts About Spousal Conflict: Personal Responsibility Must Be Expected in Public Policy. Family violence myths debunked by the American Coalition for Fathers & Children (ACFC — Missouri Chapter)

This is an excellent assessment of the evolution and of the impact of the US Violence Against Women Act, a piece of discriminatory legislation that surpasses in absurdity but not in effectiveness anything that the jurists of the Third Reich devised to rationalize the eradication of "sub-humans" and other undesirable "enemies of the state".
Men are now the new enemies of the state, and DV legislation is being produced by the ream to make not necessarily the eradication of men possible but to relegate men to the status of second-class citizens, sub-humans.
Got to start somewhere to get rid of those pesky men, right?
You may also wish to look up the history of radical feminism and its impact on society documented at the same site. Visit the pages at the following links:
http://www.dadsnow.org/
Preamble: We must now grant to fathers the same right to be in the family as we have granted to women in the workplace
http://www.dadsnow.org/index2.html
Radical feminism's first organized incarnation was within the Women's Ku Klux Klan (WKKK) in the late 1800's

Post-Klan Feminism

Lesbian Political Agenda: What its really all about

The Actual Goal sought under the guise of "lesbian rights": A Sexually-Segregated Society

Misandry Enacted Into Law

http://www.dadsnow.org/index3.html
Mainstream Feminism — not an innocent bystander.

What High-Profile Femininsts Believe (and what feminism has not been attacked for)

Now, lets go back and compare the baseline agenda of WKKK feminists of the 1880's and contemporary millenium feminists, both of which are founded in misandry.

_______________
If the term "radical feminism" (a.k.a. Marxist- or socialist-feminism) is somewhat new to you and still seems strange, you need to expand your knowledge. After all, radical feminism, the currently controlling faction of feminism, governs just about everything that is happening in your life. See,

Carey Roberts column

Carey Roberts is an analyst and commentator on political correctness. His best-known work is an exposé on Marxism and the roots of radical feminism.

Carey Roberts' best-known work, his exposé on Marxism and the roots of radical feminism, is not necessarily easy to find, but this link will help with that. (Some of the URLs for the article series appear to keep changing. For that reason the identified link leads to an Internet search for the series. The first or second link in the return list will most likely lead you to the series.)

"Where’s My Frying Pan?" Women and Domestic Violence by Richard C. Weiss
Women's Freedom Network press release on new domestic violence statistics published by the US Bureau of Justice. Erin Pizzey's reaction to new BoJ statistics.
Knocked for six: the myth of a nation of wife batterers
by Neil Lyndon and Paul Ashton, The Sunday Times of London 1995 01 29
The article is a review of various statements about the frequency of domestic violence that were made during the past 25 years, statements that are myths, wild guesses, and worse, but statements that, through sensationalizing in the media have been spread far and wide and have become— even though the dimensions of the domestic violence problem vary so widely as to boggle the mind — widely accepted as the truth.
Neil Lyndon and Paul Ashton trace the history of these deliberate misrepresentations and lies and compare the various myths to what is known about the truth in domestic violence figures, based on a report by police forces in England and Wales, released October 1994. They state:

"…We may well believe it to be true that 0.7%, or one in 150, of women living with men in London are subjected to a criminal assault in the house.
Nobody should be surprised by that figure, except the professional parasites on the domestic violence racket who will be dismayed at the prospect of their easy money drying up.
However, if that figure is true, or even nearly true, we should ask ourselves this: is it big enough to justify the colossal national flapdoodle and panic which has been made out of domestic violence towards women for the past 25 years? Or have we all been had?…"

Did the money dry up? Not by a long shot! We all know what happens to rumours and lies. They take on a life of their own, and that life has become an integral part of our society.

Update 2005 03 16:

London Metropolitan Police Service launches hate-propaganda campaign directed against men

Domestic Violence

Publicity

The Met's latest advertising campaign targets domestic violence offenders with the strong message that if you are abusing your partner, and we have reasonable grounds, we will arrest you, and we don't need your partner's statement to do this. The campaign uses posters, press ads and radio advertisements to communicate London-wide that domestic violence is a crime that the Met will not tolerate. (Full Story)

One of the beer mats to be distributed in bars throughout London and everyone of the radio adverts that are to be broadcast state that "one in four murders in London are the result of domestic violence." Common sense should tell anyone that the statement is an outright and outrageous lie.

In a Dec 10, 2000 article of his (— halfway down that page), Neil Lyndon wrote:

In the mid-1990s, I co-wrote an article (Knocked for six) which proved that a number of accepted feminist claims about domestic violence were false. For all the difference it made to what people believed then and believe now, I might as well not have bothered.

Right, Neil Lyndon is correct. There is no possible way that even hundreds of journalist who now tell us the truth will prevail in the face of the fact that literally millions of people make their existence from living off the domestic violence racket. All of those people have to protect their existence, their careers, their reputations, and their agenda.
Feminism is bringing about a totalitarian regime, made possible through the destruction of traditional moral values, families, and national boundaries. That regime is being actively promoted by the non-elected officials of the UN in their quest for world domination (they call it globalization). However, just as any totalitarian regime in history, radical feminists everywhere know that if you want lies to succeed, tell big ones, tell them often, and tell them to everyone.

Of all commodities, the truth is the hardest, and lies the easiest, to sell.

The Battered Statistic Syndrome by Armin Brott
Extracts from 'Manufacturing Concern' (see also the message announcing "Manufacturing Concern")
Husband Battering, a section in David Throop's Men's Issues Index
Myths and Facts about Domestic Violence

More Myths and Facts about family violence (containing analyses and summaries of, and references and some links to, a large number of US Bureau of Justice reports and to Canadian and British sources)
Fact: Political correctness drives and taints the politics of domestic violence statistics
Neutralizing Hostility between the Sexes : Solving the Problem of Domestic Violence with the Bigger Picture
Transcript of a speech by Chris Erickson honouring Erin Pizzey at Toronto Mensa's Annual Regional Gathering, October 19, 2002

Fact: Quote from a press release August 27, 1997 by the Women's Freedom Network:
"The new Justice Department numbers show that ALL violence is responsible for about 3% of women's INJURY-RELATED visits to emergency rooms, and domestic violence for about 1%. Since fewer than a third of women's emergency-room visits are injury-related, this means that domestic violence accounts for fewer than 0.3% of these visits. While it is possible that some domestic violence cases were not identified in the study, it is noteworthy that its estimates include not only positively established but probable cases of violence from injuries."

Fact: Reena Sommer — Male and Female Perpetrated Partner Abuse: Testing a Diathesis-Stress Model
Abstract: http://fathersforlife.org/sommertc.htm#ABSTRACT

Full indexed Text (about 20 files, 1 MB in total, or close to 300 pages) of a doctoral dissertation on the dimensions of inter-spousal violence and the correlation between the history of perpetrators of violence — abuse by their family members in their childhood in their families of origin — and their tendency to commit violence against their spouses. Within one generation, it appears, violence by women has increased enormously. Women who witnessed their fathers being hit by their mothers are more than 12 times as likely to become violent abusers of their partners than those who didn't. Violence by women now exceeds the frequency of violence by men in spousal relationships. The full text of the study report is available at this web site.

Fact: The "Rule of Thumb for Wife-Beating" Hoax
Wife beating was always illegal

Fact: The Super Bowl Wife-Battering Hoax
The article recounts the role of Sheila Kuehl, a feminist California lawyer – long ensconced in the family violence industry who then became a California senator, to boot – and those of others like her in the creation and perpetuation of the Super Bowl wife battering hoax.

Fact: To round out the picture, have a look at the collection of articles at the DOMESTIC VIOLENCE FORUM of the Shared Parenting web site.
Fact: Domestic Violence in Gay "Families"
If it is true that men are the sole perpetrators of family violence then it should be expected to see eternal bliss and peace in lesbian "families," right? That's not the case! The reality, according to Susan Holt, the program coordinator for domestic violence services at the L.A. Gay and Lesbian Center, is that 25% – 33% of gays, according to self-reports, experience violence at the hands of their partners — a problem more severe than "hate crimes." According to Susan Holt, lesbians are only slightly less likely than gay men to experience violence at the hands of their partners. If the data collected is accurate, then Gay DV is the fastest growing sector of domestic violence.

Which are more violent, heterosexual or homosexual relationships?

Gay Domestic Violence Finally Measured
Family Research Report
Vol. 16 No. 8, Dec 2001
Family Research Institute

Violence and Homosexuality, by Paul Cameron, Ph. D.; Family Research Institute

Fact: FBI Statistics on Spousal Murder, they show that gender equality works in weird and wondrous ways.
Fact: Women are the gentler sex?
Really? As can be seen from the many study reports indicated in this section, study reports that reflect the relative participation of the sexes in initiating and perpetrating violence against the opposite sex, women are as or slightly more likely than men to commit violent acts. The truly amazing thing is to what extent violent women direct their fury against the weak, the innocent and the sleeping or the intoxicated.
The perception of the public, created and nurtured through the hate crime of anti-male bias and the concept of western chivalry in the media and other sectors of society, is the primary force in maintaining the myth of the innocence of women.
The media, being almost totally dominated by feminists, feminist sympathizers and anti-male sentiments, generally reports male-on-female violence on the front pages, with follow-up articles that may bring sentiments about a given case back to light even years after a given event originally occurred. On the other hand, any violence by women against other members of society, even if these victims are women, and especially if they are children, is being reported in short, terse articles in the back pages of newspapers — provided they even make the papers — with very little personalizing of the perpetrators or victims taking place, and with very little information about the suffering of women's victims.
To level things out just a little bit, here is a collection of items about women's violent acts that did make the news, even if only in a minor way. When you go to that URL and read the articles there, pay some attention to how often violent women claim that they committed a violent act in self-defence. However, consider also how often their violence is being directed at small children and infants. Women's self-defence against small children?

Video on violent women

Canadian FV Statistics — A collection of information by E. Sodhi

See also Eeva Sodhi's letter to Health Canada, in which she provides excerpts from abstracts of family violence studies by eminent and reputable researchers. The data presented in the studies clearly and irrevocably establish that Health Canada is involved in a massive, feminist-inspired and -promoted, government-sponsored propaganda campaign that actively seeks to demonize all Canadian men.

Sexual abuse of children

Health Canada: Adolescent Sex Offenders
Information from … The National Clearinghouse on Family Violence

Female Adolescent Sex Offenders

XXX. Though a majority of adolescent sex offenders are male, research emerging over the past ten years has begun to document female sex offending. Studies of hospital, child welfare agency, and treatment programs have found that females comprise between 3% – 10% of the sex offender population. General population and victimization surveys report significantly higher numbers and extend the range up to 50% (12) and even higher (13), depending on the victim sample population studied. [My emphasis –WHS]

USA: (2003 11 06) A Lansing mother accused of molesting her 2-year-old son and broadcasting the incident on the Internet pleaded no contest Wednesday to a reduced charge.
Ashlea Rock, 21, faces a maximum of two years in prison and a $500 fine for one count of criminal sexual conduct, fourth degree, which involves sexual contact, but not penetration….
Rock was arrested last October after an FBI task force agent in Atlanta saw her fondling her son during a real-time video stream, police said….
A report by the National Clearing House on Family Violence "The Invisible Boy" examines the issue of the abuse of boys and how our society fails these poor children. As the report's title states, their suffering is truly invisible.
Take the time to read The Invisible Boy. It'll give you a fair appreciation of how much research has been done of the abuse of boys, that we don't get to see the results of that research to any large extent, and that boys are the invisible victims of abuse — simply because they are not of the right sex.
Women's Violence

Life with Mom, a sign (or button, if you wish) identifying the most common form of family violence, a mother manhandling and seriously abusing her son
Life with Mom is often violent.
It's a sad reality, but few talk about it very much. Why not?

ALBERTA EDITION
REPORT NEWSMAGAZINE
February 28, 2000, p. 36

More deadly than the male

Media hide the fact women are far likelier to kill their children than are men
by WALTER H. SCHNEIDER and CANDIS MCLEAN

Article

Hansard of the U.K. Parliament, March 2, 2006

From a debate regarding presumption of child-visitation rights by non-residential fathers:
Tim Loughton [MP]: Let me finish…

In support of its claim, the NSPCC [which is fighting hand, tooth and nail to keep non-residential fathers from having child-access rights — "in the best interest of the child"] cites the fact that 29 children were killed over the past 10 years during contact visits to non-resident parents. That is an appalling figure. However, it ignores its own research, which shows that over the same period some 800 children have died at the hands of resident parents or carers [read "mothers"], and the 2000 publication "Child Maltreatment in the UK" [1], which showed that violent treatment was more likely to be meted out by female carers than male ones. [Emphasis by F4L]

The briefing is alarmist, sensationalist, misleading, empirically flawed, completely irresponsible and highly reprehensible. It is not worthy of an organisation such as the NSPCC, which claims to stand up for our children. I hope that our deliberations on the amendments will be based on balanced, rational and well-informed debate, rather than the arrant nonsense that I am sure will shock many dedicated and hard-working NSPCC supporters around the country.

Full Transcript

______________________
References:

NSPCC Research Findings, November 2000
Child Maltreatment in the United Kingdom: a Study of the Prevalence of Abuse and Neglect
By Pat Cawson, Corinne Wattam, Sue Brooker, Graham Kelly,

Executive Summary November 2000 (PDF File – 67kB)
Most of the violent treatment (78%) had happened at home, most often by mother (49%) or father (40%).

When statistics for all family violence victims are examined, it emerges that women, primarily mothers, perpetrate by far the largest share of incidents of violence in the family. Women commit a good two-thirds of all violence against children — and the majority of child murders — in families.

Unfortunately, women's boyfriends, common-law husbands and stepfathers of children commit a substantial share of violence against children in families. Fortunately, natural fathers perpetrate a relatively insignificant share of it.

The quiet horror

The murder rate for U.S. females is highest in the first year of life.
It is a little-known trend . . . and one that shows no sign of easing

By Kirsten Scharnberg
Tribune Staff reporter
Published June 27, 2002

My Note: The interesting aspect of the article is that it bemoans that the murder rate for girls is much higher during the first year than at any other time of their life. The fact is, and the article does mention that, too, the murder rate for boys in the first year of life is quite similar and even a little higher than that for girls.
The article identifies

…a little-known and rarely publicized criminal statistic in the United States: A female is most likely to be the victim of homicide during her first year of life.

Nevertheless the most important aspect of the circumstances of infanticide is that it is in the vast majority mothers who kill their children, with mothers' boyfriends, and then stepfathers of children being distant second and third in rank. The article does mention some of that, although it obfuscates that fact by normalizing the killers as parents.
However, the fascinating aspect of the article is that, although it identifies that boys and girls are almost equally likely to be killed in their first year of life, it uses only examples of girls who were killed by their mothers or their mother's live-in boyfriends.
Although the article is fairly honest and objective and far more so than many others, its aim is to identify girls as victims and not so much the real objective truth, namely that mothers – if left unsupervised – are exceedingly dangerous to infants, and equally so to boys and girls.
However, who wants to blame Kirsten Scharnberg for putting her particular spin on the story. Girls as victims are sooo much more fascinating to readers than are mothers as murderesses. Given that the fact of mothers being the predominant killers of children can't be denied, then what is wrong with invoking the public's pity for the murderesses as well? That always worked and still does.
—WHS

Violence by men against women in families is a relatively minor portion of all family violence.
Families headed by two married parents (one of each sex) are, short of widowhood, the safest and least violent environment of all for women, by far.
The sad truth is that the most violent domestic relationships occur in "families" of which men are no part, those between partnered lesbians.

Child Abuse: Statistics, Research, and Resources.
A collection of information from a large number of studies, stressing that boys are subjected to abuse about as often as girls are and stressing as well that even though these rates are much higher than many thought them to be, they are conservative estimates.
Although the report does not point a finger at either women or men as being the abusers, does that really matter? What matters is that at least half of the children who are being abused are being ignored and not being helped. If you are a victim of sexual abuse that you received as a child, you'll find within the report a large collection of URLs that might be of help to you now.

Mothers in the USA more than twice as likely than fathers to kill their children (Posted 2006 05 01)

The website of the US Department of Health and Human Services, Administration for Children & Families contains information on the rate of child maltreatment deaths per 100,000 children.

The information shows that mothers are more than twice as likely than fathers are to kill their children. (Child Maltreatment 2004, Chapter 4, Fatalities, US DHHS, ACF)

It must be recognized that the information identified above is for all "family" types, including families with married, never married, divorced, adoptive and foster parents. Treating "family" types as individual categories, it has been found in Britain that a child whose mother cohabits is 73 times more likely to suffer fatal abuse than a child whose parents are married. (The Social Scientific Data on the Impact of Marriage and Divorce on Children by Patrick F. Fagan, Heritage Foundation; Testimony Before the Senate of the United States, Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation; Subcommittee on Science, Technology, And Space regarding the Social Scientific Data on the Impact of Marriage and Divorce on Children. — Map of the Family Powerpoint Presentation)

Gender as a factor in the Family Violence Courts, by Eeva Sodhi
An Examination of Assumed Properties of Child Sexual Abuse Based on Non-clinical Samples
Paper presented to the symposium sponsored by the Paulus Kerk, Rotterdam, The Netherlands, on the 18th of December 1998

The extent of involvement by women in the sexual abuse of children

As identified in "The Invisible Boy" a considerable number of studies has investigated that subject. A search using the string "sexual abuse by women" and altavista.digital.com/ will return about 17 URLs.* The studies indicated in both of these sources identify rates of incidents of sexual abuse by women of child-victims of sexual abuse that range from about 10% to about 80% in the sample populations studied.
* That was about five years ago. As of February 5, 2002, a search using google.com for the same string returned about 200 URLs.

Here are some of those URLs and some that have been found since then:

According to Harry Krop, a licensed psychologist in Gainesville, Florida:
"The motivation for adult women who form a sexual relationship with boys is different than men who develop relationships with girls. Men who have sex with girls, tend to have sexual disorders, such as pedophilia. But for women, it's not about the sex, but rather the romance. It's more of a need to be desired, to have someone find them attractive and the need for attention…." (Full Story)
In his interview Harry Krop apparently didn't say anything about women who have sexual relations with under-age girls or about men who have sexual relations with under-age boys. Nevertheless, Harry Krop is not the only one who views sexual child abuse by women as far less harmful than sexual child abuse by men. It is not only people like Harry Krop that make a living by spreading the gospel of "Women Good, Men Bad" when it comes to finding guilt in women. Take this compendium of sexual child abuse cases in which women were perpetrators as guilty as any male abuser but all being women who were routinely treated very leniently.

Source: U.S. Department of Education, Office of the Under Secretary, Educator Sexual Misconduct: A Synthesis of Existing Literature, Washington, D.C., 2004; p. 25

Note that most if not all of the studies mentioned in the preceding reference document are somewhat limited in their objectivity on account of questions such as these:
Did anyone do any of the following to you when you didn't want them to in the last school year?

Touch, pinch, or grab you.
Lean over you or corner you.
Give you sexual notes or pictures.
Make suggestive or sexual gestures, looks, comments, or jokes.
Pressure you to do something sexual.
Force you to do something sexual.
All interactions of a sexual nature with minors, whether welcomed by the minors or not, constitute statutory rape. It is therefore nothing but an excuse to exclude teacher-student sexual intercourse in which the intercourse took place with the students' consent and not against the students' wishes. For that reason it can be assumed that the incident rate of teacher-student sexual intercourse is seriously under-estimated in all studies that ask such limiting questions. Surveys based on such self-limiting questions don't address smart and successful seducers of children.
Female Perpetration of Child Sexual Abuse: An Overview of the Problem, by Lisa Lipshires http://movingforward.org/v2n6-cover.html
When Girls Do It, An examination of female sexual predators, a CTV program that was aired in 2001. The video (45 minutes) can be purchased. A number of clips are available at the website for When Girls do it.
From the site:

"When Girls Do It" features compelling testimony and powerful interviews with survivors of abuse by female sexual offenders, therapists, and psychologists. The documentary delves into related issues including the long-held misconception that sexual abuse of children is exclusively a male crime.

2006 04 20
Female Sexual Predators: The Veiled Epidemic

By Gordon E. Finley, Ph.D.

Full Story

The Sexual Abuse by Women of Children and Teenagers
Summary of UK TV programme – Panorama – BBC1 – 10 pm Monday 6th October 1997 http://www.vix.com/menmag/panosumm.htm

Full transcript of the program http://www.vix.com/menmag/panofull.htm

The psychological impact of sexual abuse: Content analysis of interviews with male survivors (off-site) [warning, 2 megabyte PDF], Lisak, D. (1994), Journal of Traumatic Stress, 7, 525-548.

http://www.wnd.com/news/article.asp?ARTICLE_ID=28336
WorldNetDaily.com

Posted: 22 July 2002, 1:00 a.m. Eastern

Meet 'Women's Auxiliary of NAMBLA'
Website celebrates sex between adult women, young girls

By Art Moore

Celebrating erotic relationships between women and young girls is the theme of a website called "Butterfly Kisses,*" which indicates the relatively unknown fact that pedophilia exists in significant numbers among females….
Linda Halliday-Sumner, a sexual abuse consultant in Courtenay, B.C., Canada, told WND that when she first began in 1980, about 1.5 percent of her cases were women who abuse minors. Within six years that increased to 11 to 13 percent. In the last 10 years, she said, at least 33 percent of her 325 cases a year have been women….
Studies in the 1980s by researchers David Finkelhor and Diana Russell estimated that in the United States about 14 percent of abuse cases involving boys were perpetrated by females. About 6 percent of the cases were of women who abuse girls.
While these studies give some clues, the true number of women who have sexual contact with children is probably severely underestimated, according to German psychologist Marina Knopf. …
She writes that it "is less spoken of, more hidden, and the women do not have any groups they attend or have formed themselves as do men. … The strength of this taboo might help explain the enormous difficulty we had in finding women to interview."
Well-known pedophile advocate Pat Califia… writes in an article posted on the "Butterfly Kisses" site that, "It is possible that sexual activity occurs more often between mothers and children or other women than between men and children. Women have more access to kids, and there are fewer taboos surrounding women's handling young people's bodies."
(Full story)

Copies of many or most of the articles that were contained at the original "Butterfly Kisses" website can be accessed at http://inoohr.com. See there:

Butterfly Kisses

Lesbian pedophiles

Michigan Womyn's Music Festival

Girl Scouts of America

Big Sisters — The second article on that page is about Big Sisters, but a site search will produce more hits.

Woman charged with rape of boy
Wendy McElroy discusses:
Feminist Urban Legends
The FOXNews URL is

The ifeminists.com URL is

Tuesday, November 12, 2002

By Wendy McElroy

Advocacy research refers to studies and reports produced by people with a vested interest in reaching a foregone conclusion. Politically correct feminism is notorious for its advocacy research and for the shoddy methodology that often accompanies political bias. (Full Story)

Fox News chose to omit the modifier “feminist” in their title for the article, however, it is a must for anyone to read the article, regardless of what title is chosen for it. The article lists excellent standards that should be applied by the media in choosing articles for publishing, so as to put an end to the promotion of advocacy research, slander and ad-hominem attacks by opponents of the truth.

Government-promoted and taxpayer funded hate-propaganda

Massive, government-sponsored hate propaganda that demonizes all Canadian men at the Canadian National Clearing House on Family Violence, a Health Canada web site. Comments and a bibliography of studies that should be but aren’t shown at the Health Canada web site.
The Alberta Government doesn’t want to be left behind in demonizing men
The American Psychological Association and its stand on Child Sexual Abuse (CSA)

The APA’s stand on CSA is so onerous that some of the messages I receive expand the abbreviation of its name to “The American Pedophilia Association?” In one of those messages I received a reference to a recent public outcry about a study that had been promoted by the APA. The study had been hailed by NAMBLA (North American Man-Boy Love Association) as evidence that adult-child sex was truly not harmful to children.
However, as the following two items show, the study was no more than a piece of advocacy research every bit as bad as the now discredited advocacy research done by Alfred Kinsey. What the items show is also that the APA is mainly a political body that reacts more to public pressure than according to its twisted social agenda, and that perhaps its agenda would never have come into existence if the public would have taken a greater interest in what the APA is promoting. It seems that if enough objections are raised by the majority of people that the minorities aren’t really that all-powerful.
APA Takes Harder Stance Against Controversial Study

WASHINGTON — Backing away from a controversial article that had said child molestation with “willing” children may not be harmful, and may, in some cases, even be beneficial, the American Psychological Association unveiled Wednesday a resolution condemning all “sexual relations between children and adults.”
“After much pressure, the APA has begun to undo the damage wrought by its publication of a badly conceived article that has been hailed by such groups as the North American Man-Boy Love Association (NAMBLA),” said FRC’s Chief Spokesperson Janet Parshall. “It’s a good first step, but now the APA needs to root out the pro-pedophilic academicians who are trying to normalize child abuse. And the APA should write to NAMBLA and strongly urge them not to use this article as justification for molesting young boys.”

Full article at http://mentalhelp.net/articles/apa6.htm

The next item is a press release by the Family Research Council that refutes the advocacy-research study at the centre of the uproar:

Family Research Council
“It is as if a study that purports to examine the effects of being shot in the head contained a majority of cases in which the marksman missed. Such research might demonstrate that being shot in the head generally has no serious or lasting effects!”
—Dr. Paul Fink,
Past President of the American Psychiatric Association,

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE: May 20, 1999
CONTACT: Kristin Hansen, (202) 393-2100

FRC RESPONDS TO CRITICISM BY AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGICAL
ASSOCIATION AND AUTHORS OF CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE STUDY

WASHINGTON, DC – Family Research Council (FRC) released the following statement Thursday in response to a statement made on May 12 by the authors of a recent child sexual abuse study, “A Meta-Analytic Examination of Assumed Properties of Child Sexual Abuse Using College Samples,” published by the American Psychological Association (APA). The authors’ statement, which was printed on APA letterhead, criticized FRC’s position on the study.
It was released by the APA in light of a press conference addressing the study that FRC was to hold that day. FRC’s statement follows:

Full article at http://www.frc.org/press/052099.html

Satanic Ritual Abuse

Satan’s Excellent Adventure in the Antipodes, a paper by Michael Hill, Professor of Sociology, Victoria University of Wellington. The paper traces the history of the satanic-ritual-abuse scare from its arrival in Australia and NZ to the present time. The paper also contains a summary of the emergence of the satanic ritual abuse ideology in the American psychological industry.
A Modern Witch Hunt Trial in New Zealand, The horror of the persecution of Peter Hugh McGregor Ellis.

David Throop’s Subject index on Men’s Issues contains a large number of entries of references to sources of pertinent information.
False Abuse Allegations, how many of them are there, and what are their consequences?
Getting Rid of Dad
Cover of Western Report, Aug. 17, 1992

False allegations levelled against men who are said to have sexually abused their children have become the weapon of choice in custody battles following divorce and separation.

(Full Story)

THE ACLU SPORTS HALL OF SHAME — HATE CRIMES AGAINST WOMEN?
This “ACLU” is not to be confused with the “other one”, the American Civil Liberties Union. This one is run by feminists (with the help of men who like to bash other men) who claim to be opposed to pornography and violence against women but are in favour of violence against men. It comes as no surprise that they most certainly are not in favour of balanced reporting.

Note that in the long list of cases cited at the ACLU site, there isn’t a single one listed of a hate crime committed by a women against a man, not even one of a hate crime committed by a woman against another woman. Indeed, why single out alleged crimes by men against women? Note also that only a small fraction of the alleged crimes actually resulted in convictions in criminal court, and that many of the accusations were later dropped. How many of the cited cases were based on false allegations? How many of the convictions resulted from false allegations?

Toronto Police Hate-Crime Policies — Tools for the suppression of free speech, a symptom of universal national and international trends?
COMMON SENSE & DOMESTIC VIOLENCE — Newsletters (links shown below)

These contain collections of statistics, essays and other information from various sources — all pertaining to the issue of family violence. Download, print and distribute them. The printed originals, with the body of the text in size 10 font, were about ten 8 1/2″ x 11″ pages each. The originals are in two-column format. MS Word 6 document files can be made available to anyone who would like to reproduce the newsletters in the original format. e-mail: Fathers for Life
Printed copies of the originals were sent to all Canadian federal and Alberta provincial legislators, to some Canadian senators, to various father’s rights activists, and to various media organizations. The production and distribution of the newsletters had to cease on account of total absence of funding.
My pension income is insufficient to keep on producing the newsletters, and my taxes were increased to help contribute toward the tens of millions of dollars in funding generously provided to the heterophobic and family-hostile organizations supported through the office of the Secretary of State Status of Women and comparably-biased Canadian provincial government offices.
Four issues were produced. Three were printed and distributed. Time and money ran out during the production of the fourth issue, with the purchase of food and other necessities of life taking higher priority. The following are links to HTML versions of the three published issues.
The Pillory 1997 12 24,

Battered Women’s Shelters and Abuse Allegations 1998 01 03,

Family Violence — Trends, Results 1998 01 30

One Father’s Story — The sad story of the destruction of one family on account of family violence.
Researching the “Rape Culture” of America — An Investigation of Feminist Claims about Rape, By Christina Hoff Sommers, Associate Professor of Philosophy, Clark University
Spare the rod and run for cover — When students hold the cards, school violence grows, especially among the girls
War in the Family An account of one battle skirmish near Calgary, Alberta, Canada.
What politicians are doing about it:

Speeches by Sen. Anne C. Cools, relating to FV

___________________
See also:

Table of Contents for Feminism and Related Issues
Video on violent women
______________
UPDATES
2000 03 10
2000 04 03 (to show reference to rape)
2000 04 04 (to show link to information about the bloody and deadly Countess Elizabeth Bathory)
2000 05 04 (to show link to E. Sodhi’s collection of Canadian FV statistics)
2000 05 06 (to remove a couple of dead links)
2000 05 09 (to INSTALL search engine)
2000 05 23 (to add link to information about lesbian DV)
2000 06 08 (to show link to Carl Friedan’s story)
2000 06 27 (added links to information to government-sponsored hate propaganda aiming to demonize all men.)
2000 08 27 (added link to Colorado men’s help-line information)
2000 12 01 (to add link to Gender as a factor in Family Violence Courts)
2001 01 31 (format changes)
2001 02 06 (added link to Martin S. Fiebert’s Annotated Bibliography)
2001 02 15 (added entry for Parents Helping Parents)
2001 03 12 (added reference to Getting Rid of Dad)
2001 04 09 (added link to Letter to John Ashcroft, US Attorney General)
2001 04 12 UPDATED links to M. Fiebert’s bibliography)
2001 04 19 (added link to WFN press release re: new US DoJ stats on domestic violence)
2001 10 26 (made entry for The Nature of Domestic Violence Against Men)
2001 12 09 (added entry for A tool kit to destroy families)
2001 12 14 (added link to The troubles with DV murder statistics)
2001 12 29 (inserted comment on Elderly Abuse)
2002 01 31 (added reference to article on women’s violence)
2002 02 04 (inserted graphics file Life with Mom and related note)
2002 02 05 (edited note slightly to correct grammar)
2002 07 22 (Added link to article on ‘Women’s Auxiliary of NAMBLA’)
2002 08 03 (added reference to Female Adolescent Sex Offenders)
2002 09 10 (re-formated tables)
2002 10 01 (inserted links to articles by Dave Brown from the Ottawa Citizen)
2002 10 20 (inserted reference to St. Louis Post-Dispatch series of articles on the killing of elderly in US nursing homes.)
2002 11 08 (inserted entry for transcript of speech by Chris Erickson in honour of Erin Pizzey, the founder of the women’s shelter movement and a TARGET of feminist persecution, vilification, censorship and ostracism)
2002 11 13 (inserted Wendy McElroy’s article “Feminist Urban Legends”. It deals with the need to put an end to the popularizing of gender-biased advocacy research.)
2002 12 14 (inserted link to article in the Chicago Tribune, “The quiet horror”, about infanticide)
2002 12 19 (added links to articles covering lesbian child sexual abuse)
2002 12 22 (format changes)
2003 07 22 (added reference to False Rape Charges Hurt Real Victims)
2003 07 31 (added comments about recognition of abuse)
2003 10 27 (added reference to Reena Sommer’s speech on Controversy Within Family Violence Research)
2003 12 11 (added reference to David Fontes’ analysis of “domestic violence” statistics)
2004 01 14 (added abbreviated index to this page)
2004 01 17 (added reference to When Girls Do It)
2004 03 13 (added reference to History of domestic violence among male patients…)
2004 06 18 (added reference to article on intimates murdered by women)
2004 06 24 (added entry for SUN — Seniors United Now)
2004 09 16 (added reference to commentary on wrongful convictions, re: “faulty” hair analyses)
2005 02 21 (added reference to MCSN)
2005 03 16 (added information on London MPS hate-campaign against men)
2006 02 16 (added The Myth of Female Innocence)
2006 04 28 (added references to female sex-offenders and educator sexual misconduct)
2007 03 09 (added pointer to report on male and female DV rates)
2013 03 08 (removed reference to dvstats.org — WEBSITE no longer functions)

Disclaimer | copyright 1998-2013 all rights reserved by Walter Schneider | Copyright information | Contact | Share

The Appearance that Pam L. office has lots of shadows and they run deep into the pockets of Title IV monies and Massive GREED from the state actors.

March 5, 2016 § Leave a comment

The Herald-Review (Decatur IL, USA)
21 February 1999
Former State Resident Given Formal Apology by Illinois Division of Child Support Enforcement.

by Amanda Wilson

The Illinois State Supreme Court has ordered Guy Hastings, Director of Child Support Enforcement, to send a formal letter of apology to a former Illinois state resident who was forced to pay $9000 more in support than ordered. Paul Laird, now a resident of Washington state and a former resident of Strasburg, IL, has said he will make a written statement in a few days. The Court also ordered DCSE to pay him almost $150,000 in punitive damages.

The pertinent facts are not in dispute. Mr. Laird was ordered to pay $400/mo in child support in 1985. Kankakee County records indicate Mr. Laird had voluntarily overpaid his account by May, 1991. That is when his troubles started.

Mr. Laird was forced to take a medical leave of absence due to Multiple Sclerosis. He presented Illinois DCSE doctor statements and 7 requests for temporary reduction from November 1991 through May, 1993. He was never answered by Illinois DCSE and they now admit that he did send the request and that those requests were ignored. They also admit Mr. Laird never missed a payment.

A suit was filed by DCSE in November, 1993 to modify the child support award. Mr. Laird was never notified of this hearing. The department received a default judgment increasing the support amount to $800. DCSE admits Mr. Laird was never notified of the new amount.

The amount was reduced in 1996 back to the original $400 figure. DCSE CONTINUED to count the extra $400 from November 1993 to October, 1996 as child support arrears. They garnished his wages, filed liens against him, reported him to CREDIT BUREAUS and continue collection thought taking his IRS refunds. Mr. Laird filed suit in 1996 against DCSE and specific employees within that agency. The Appellate Court awarded him almost $60,000 in January, 1998. That judgment has been paid.

The State’s Attorney of Champaign County filed charges of malfesciance of office against three DCSE employees – Karen Breaker, Linda Richardson, and Barbara McCloud. Breaker and Richardson were also tried on perjury, falsifiction of records, and theft. McCloud was found not guilty in November, 1998. Breaker plead guilty to the charge of perjury and falsification in a plea bargain. Ms. Richardson was found guilty on all counts and sentenced to 18 months in prison. All three lost their jobs with
Illinois DCSE.

This is only the first of 8 cases against the Champaign office. In the most recent case a custodial mother received child support payments 9 months after the father made payments through the court. The father in this case was prosecuted for non-payment and was found not guilty when he presented receipts and cancelled checks. A check by the Auditor’s office revealed a practice by the Champaign office of putting support checks in a hidden fund to draw interest for the state. That case has been merged with 7 others in a class action lawsuit. It is scheduled to be heard in April, 2000.

Governor Ryan and his cabinet were unavailable for comment. This reporter has verified that the governor urged DCSE to settle this case out-of-court and that Mr. Hastings refused. DCSE director Hastings also had no comment.

Because the state was found to have acted fraudulently in his case, the Supreme Court had to rule on punitive damages.

The Appearance of one of the biggest Crooks in CROOK COUNTY IL. Thanks D.B.

October 20, 2015 § Leave a comment

0 Post a Comment
D brown main
Under investigation for well over a year for possible corruption, Cook County Circuit Court Clerk Dorothy Brown is facing more scrutiny from law enforcement, including a federal probe focusing in part on personnel decisions made by her office.

One source familiar with the case said the U.S. attorney’s office in Chicago has an active grand jury looking into Brown’s conduct, including loans she may have received from employees “in connection to employment.”

Another source relayed being interviewed by the FBI more than a year ago, saying, “They asked me about personnel stuff, was somebody paying for a job . . . why was this person promoted . . . pay to play.”

The revelations come as federal agents visited Brown’s South Side house last week and seized her county-issued cellphone, developments first reported by Politico.

Approached by a reporter at the Columbus Day parade this week, Brown dismissed questions about an FBI visit to her home and a federal investigation as “rumor” and the product of “political season.” She has consistently denied any wrongdoing.

The federal investigation appears to be an outgrowth of a probe by Cook County Inspector General Patrick Blanchard, who began investigating Brown following a November 2013 news story by the Better Government Association and FOX Chicago about a land deal involving Brown, her husband, Benton Cook III, and Brown campaign donor Naren Patel.

Patel gave a Near Southwest Side commercial building to Cook in 2011. Ownership of the building was then transferred to Brown’s consulting company, Sankofa Group LLC, which then sold the parcel in 2012 for $100,000 to a partnership affiliated with a Frankfort developer named Musa Tadros.

None of this was listed on Brown’s campaign filings or ethics statements, as apparently it should have been.

Not only did the inspector general start looking at Brown, the Cook County state’s attorney’s office and the Chicago FBI also joined in.

Tadros recently told a reporter he was subpoenaed a year or more ago to provide records and testify before a grand jury looking into the land transaction.

Tadros said he thought it was a state – not federal – grand jury. “It was about a year ago, I haven’t heard anything since,” Tadros said recently.

“I didn’t do anything kinky,” he said. “I actually overpaid [for the building purchased from Brown’s firm] and tore it down.”

Patel – who donated more than $85,000 to Brown’s campaign fund over the years and has a relative employed by Brown’s office as a high-level official – has since died.

More than a year back, the Circuit Court clerk’s office was subpoenaed by the U.S. attorney’s office for Brown’s “office emails on the office email system,” according to a source with knowledge of the request. However, after some back and forth between prosecutors and Brown’s office, the subpoena was never fulfilled, with the feds apparently backing off, the source said.

It’s unclear why — and whether the subpoena related to the land deal or something else.

Federal authorities declined to comment.

There has been another federal investigation, centered in Springfield, into how Brown’s husband, among others, ended up with anti-violence grant money from then-Gov. Pat Quinn’s administration. Investigators were looking into whether politics drove the distribution of grant money.

Despite having a felony conviction for a financial crime, Cook was paid $146,401 over two years to oversee subcontractors in the program, called the Neighborhood Recovery Initiative, records show.

Brown has been the subject of considerable attention by the media in recent years.

News stories have centered on, among other things, Circuit Court clerk employees donating money to Brown’s campaign. Brown also has encouraged employees to participate in a marketing business called 5LINX that Brown has been part of.

“Some employees had received emails from her” about 5LINX, said a former Circuit Court clerk employee.

The Circuit Court clerk’s office has endured past scandals. One of Brown’s predecessors, Morgan Finley, was convicted in a late 1980s bribery case and went to prison.

Over the years some have suggested eliminating the Circuit Court clerk position – at least as an elected job. The office is the repository of court records, and an enduring source of patronage jobs.

Brown, who is up for reelection in 2016, sought and received an endorsement from the Cook County Democratic Party in August, despite published reports that she was being investigated.

This story was written and reported by the Better Government Association’s Robert Herguth and Patrick Rehkamp, FOX Chicago’s Dane Placko and Chris Fusco of the Chicago Sun-Times. The BGA’s Katie Drews and the Sun-Times’ Jon Seidel and Mitch Dudek contributed. To reach the BGA, call (312) 821-9030 or rherguth@bettergov.org.

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